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Seeing Versus Doing: Two Modes of Accessing Causal Knowledge

Seeing Versus Doing: Two Modes of Accessing Causal Knowledge The ability to derive predictions for the outcomes of potential actions from observational data is one of the hallmarks of true causal reasoning. We present four learning experiments with deterministic and probabilistic data showing that people indeed make different predictions from causal models, whose parameters were learned in a purely observational learning phase, depending on whether learners believe that an event within the model has been merely observed (“seeing”) or was actively manipulated (“doing”). The predictions reflect sensitivity both to the structure of the causal models and to the size of their parameters. This competency is remarkable because the predictions for potential interventions were very different from the patterns that had actually been observed. Whereas associative and probabilistic theories fail, recent developments of causal Bayes net theories provide tools for modeling this competency. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition American Psychological Association

Seeing Versus Doing: Two Modes of Accessing Causal Knowledge

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References (39)

Publisher
American Psychological Association
Copyright
Copyright © 2005 American Psychological Association
ISSN
0278-7393
eISSN
1939-1285
DOI
10.1037/0278-7393.31.2.216
pmid
15755240
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The ability to derive predictions for the outcomes of potential actions from observational data is one of the hallmarks of true causal reasoning. We present four learning experiments with deterministic and probabilistic data showing that people indeed make different predictions from causal models, whose parameters were learned in a purely observational learning phase, depending on whether learners believe that an event within the model has been merely observed (“seeing”) or was actively manipulated (“doing”). The predictions reflect sensitivity both to the structure of the causal models and to the size of their parameters. This competency is remarkable because the predictions for potential interventions were very different from the patterns that had actually been observed. Whereas associative and probabilistic theories fail, recent developments of causal Bayes net theories provide tools for modeling this competency.

Journal

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and CognitionAmerican Psychological Association

Published: Mar 1, 2005

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