Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

Kelly, Laura Jane; Khemlani, Sangeet

2023 Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

doi: 10.1037/xlm0001269pmid: 37676127

Descriptions of durational relations can be ambiguous, for example, the description “one meeting happened during another” could mean that one meeting started before the other ended, or it could mean that the meetings started and ended simultaneously. A recent theory posits that people mentally simulate descriptions of durational events by representing their starts and ends along a spatial axis, that is, an iconic representation of time. To draw conclusions from this iconic mental model, reasoners consciously scan it in the direction of earlier to later timepoints. The account predicts an iconicity bias: People should prefer descriptions that are congruent with an iconic scanning procedure—descriptions that mention the starts of events before the ends of events—over logically equivalent but incongruent descriptions. Six experiments corroborated the prediction; they show that iconicity biases in temporal reasoning manifest in cases when reasoners consciously evaluate the durations of events.

Whitlock, Jonathon; Hubbard, Ryan; Ding, Huiyu; Sahakyan, Lili

2023 Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

doi: 10.1037/xlm0001286pmid: 37668566

Eye-tracking methodologies have revealed that eye movements and pupil dilations are influenced by our previous experiences. Dynamic fluctuations in pupil size during learning reflect in part the formation of memories for learned information, while viewing behavior during memory testing is influenced by memory retrieval and drawn to previously learned associations. However, no study to date has linked fluctuations in pupil dilation at encoding to the magnitude of viewing behavior at test. The current investigation involved monitoring eye movements both in single item recognition and relational recognition tasks. In the item task, all faces were presented with the same background scene and memory for faces was subsequently tested, whereas in the relational task each face was presented with its own unique background scene and memory for the face–scene association was subsequently tested. Pupil size changes during encoding predicted the magnitude of preferential viewing during test, as well as future recognition accuracy. These effects emerged only in the relational task, but not in the item task, and were replicated in an additional experiment in which stimulus luminance was more tightly controlled. A follow-up experiment and additional analyses ruled out differences in orienting instructions or number of fixations to the encoding display as explanations of the observed effects. The results shed light on the links between pupil dilation, memory encoding, and eye movement patterns during recognition and suggest that trial-level fluctuations in pupil dilation during encoding reflect relational binding of items to their context rather than general memory formation or strength.

Wang, Jianqin; Otgaar, Henry; Howe, Mark L.

2023 Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

doi: 10.1037/xlm0001283pmid: 37676128

When memories of past rewarding experiences are distorted, are relevant decision-making preferences impacted? Although recent research has demonstrated the important role of episodic memory in value-based decision making, very few have examined the role of false memory in guiding novel decision making. The current study combined the pictorial Deese/Roediger–McDermott false memory paradigm with a reward learning task, where participants learned that items from some related lists gained reward and items from other lists led to no reward. Later, participants’ memories and decision-making preferences were tested. With three experiments conducted in three countries, we successfully created false memories of rewarding experiences in which participants falsely remembered seeing a nonpresented lure picture bring them reward thereby confirming our constructive association hypothesis. Such false memories led participants to prefer the lure pictures and respond faster in a follow-up decision-making task, and the more false memories they formed, the higher preferences for the lure items they displayed (Experiment 2). Finally, results were replicated with or without a memory test before the decision-making task, showing that the impact of false memory on decision making was not cued by a memory test (Experiment 3). Our data suggest that the reconstructive nature of memory enables individuals to create new memory episodes to guide decision making in novel situations.

Ratcliff, Roger; McKoon, Gail

2023 Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

doi: 10.1037/xlm0001285pmid: 37676126

There has been considerable interest in what components of decision-making change when speed or accuracy is stressed. In many early studies, quite strict assumptions were made about parameter invariance across experimental conditions (sometimes called selective influence). Here we fit the standard diffusion model to the data from four large experiments with speed–accuracy instructions (with over a million total responses), allowing all model parameters to vary freely between the speed and accuracy conditions. Results show that most of the observed differences between speed and accuracy conditions appear in the boundary separation parameter, followed by nondecision time, with small effects on drift rates. However, changes in drift rates are accompanied by changes in across-trial variability in drift rate, which cancels out the effect of drift rate on accuracy and response time. Another analysis in which across-trial variance in drift rate was kept the same in fits to speed and accuracy conditions produced no difference in drift rates. Generally, if speed is stressed moderately, then both boundary separation and nondecision time are reduced and any changes in drift rate are compensated for by changes in the across-trial variance in drift rates. If speed is stressed to a high degree (Starns et al., 2012), boundary separation, nondecision time, and drift rates are reduced. This is because (we hypothesize) encoding is restricted leading to a lower degree of perceptual information or match with memory.

Zhong, Miao; Siu, Carrey Tik Sze; Cheung, Him

2023 Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

doi: 10.1037/xlm0001287pmid: 37676125

This study shows that exposure to topic-related but irrelevant information enhances both estimates of peer knowledge and our own sense of knowledge. In Experiment 1, participants were more confident in their answers to general knowledge questions and gave higher estimates of peer knowledge when such questions were accompanied by short paragraphs containing topic-related yet nondiagnostic information than when they were not. The inflated peer knowledge estimates were independent of the classic curse of knowledge. Experiments 2, 3, 5, and 6 demonstrated that irrelevant information biases knowledge estimation via its semantic relatedness to the test questions; response latencies were measured in Experiments 5 and 6 to examine the possible role of retrieval fluency in the semantic relatedness effect. Experiment 4 attributed the bias to information content (e.g., “it is generally known that keratin is responsible”), not comments on knowledge popularity (e.g., “what is responsible is generally known”). Importantly, the effect of irrelevant information on estimates of peer knowledge was fully mediated by confidence in own knowledge in Experiments 1, 2, 4, and 5. Experiment 6 manipulated retrieval fluency and failed to find conclusive evidence for its involvement in the semantic relatedness effect. We conclude that irrelevant information boosts peer knowledge estimation through its semantic relatedness to the problem at hand, and the effect is mostly explained by a corresponding increase in the individual’s own sense of knowledge.

Lupker, Stephen J.; Spinelli, Giacomo

2023 Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition

doi: 10.1037/xlm0001289pmid: 37668567

Rastle et al. (2004) reported that true (e.g., walker) and pseudo (e.g., corner) multi-morphemic words prime their stem words more than form controls do (e.g., brothel priming BROTH) in a masked priming lexical decision task. This data pattern has led a number of models to propose that both of the former word types are “decomposed” into their stem (e.g., walk, corn) and affix (e.g., -er) early in the reading process. The present experiments were designed to examine the models proposed to explain Rastle et al.’s effect, including models not assuming a decomposition process, using a more sensitive priming technique, sandwich priming (Lupker & Davis, 2009). Experiment 1, using the conventional masked priming procedure, replicated Rastle et al.’s results. Experiments 2 and 3, involving sandwich priming procedures, showed a clear dissociation between priming effects for true versus pseudo multi-morphemic words, results that are not easily explained by any of the current models. Nonetheless, the overall data pattern does appear to be most consistent with there being a decomposition process when reading real and pseudo multi-morphemic words, a process that involves activating (and inhibiting) lexical-level representations including a representation for the affix (e.g., -er), with the ultimate lexical decision being based on the process of resolving the pattern created by the activated representational units.