Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/springer-journals/networks-law-and-the-paradox-of-cooperation-zt0R2ar38R
References (93)
-
C. Calomiris (1990)
Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical PerspectiveJournal of Economic History, 50
-
T. Zywicki (2000)
The Economics of Credit CardsChapman Law Review, 3
-
L. Telser (1980)
A Theory of Self-Enforcing AgreementsJournal of Business, 53
-
T. Zywicki (2000)
Chapman Law Review, 3
-
E. Stringham (2003)
The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth Century AmsterdamQuarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43
-
R. Timberlake (1984)
The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse AssociationsJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16
-
G. Gorton (1985)
Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United StatesJournal of Economic History, 45
-
R. Timberlake (1984)
The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse AssociationsJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 16
-
E. Stringham (2002)
The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing ClubJournal of Private Enterprise, 17
-
S. Salop, L. J. White (1991)
Policy Watch: Antitrust Goes to CollegeJournal of Economic Perspectives, 5
-
D. Gabel (1994)
Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry, 1894-1910Journal of Economic History, 54
-
J. C. Rochet, J. Tirole (2000)
Cooperation among Competitors: The Economics of Payment Card Associations -
D. Lal (1997)
The Cato Journal, 17
-
T. Cowen (1992)
Law as a Public Good: The Economics of AnarchyEconomics and Philosophy, 8
-
D. Friedman (1994)
Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of AnarchyEconomics and Philosophy, 10
-
T. Cowen (1994)
Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of AnarchyEconomics and Philosophy, 10
-
K. Dowd (1994)
Competitive Banking, Bankers' Clubs, and Bank RegulationJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26
-
G. Gorton (1985)
Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United StatesJournal of Economic History, 45
-
W. Neale (1964)
The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports: A Contribution to the Theory of the Firm in Sporting Competition and in Market CompetitionQuarterly Journal of Economics, 78
-
D. Lal (1997)
From Planning to Regulation: Toward a New Dirigisme?The Cato Journal, 17
-
J. Veitch (1986)
Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval StateJournal of Economic History, 46
-
D. Carlton, A. Frankel (1995)
The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card Networks: Reply to Evans and Schmalensee CommentAntitrust Law Journal, 63
-
W. Boal, M. Ransom (1997)
Monopsony in the Labor MarketJournal of Economic Literature, 35
-
S. J. Liebowitz, S. Margolis (1994)
Network Externality: An Uncommon TragedyJournal of Economic Perspectives, 8
-
E. Stringham (1999)
Journal of Libertarian Studies, 14
-
S. J. Liebowitz, S. Margolis (1998)
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law -
T. Cowen, D. Sutter (1999)
The Costs of CooperationThe Review of Austrian Economics, 12
-
M. Katz, C. Shapiro (1985)
Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility.American Economic Review, 75
-
E. Stringham (1999)
Market Chosen LawJournal of Libertarian Studies, 14
-
R. Fort (1995)
Journal of Economic Literature, 33
-
G. Tullock (1974)
The Social Dilemma: The Economics of War and Revolution -
V. L. Smith (1980)
American Economic Review, 70
-
T. Sowell (1994)
Race and Culture -
G. Gorton (1987)
The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank ClearinghousesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 19
-
S. J. Liebowitz (1995)
Research in Law and Economics, 17
-
D. Friedman (1994)
Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of AnarchyEconomics and Philosophy, 10
-
S. J. Liebowitz, S. Margolis (1995)
Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?Research in Law and Economics, 17
-
D. Schmidtz (1991)
The Limits of Government: An Essay on the Public Goods Argument -
A. Greif (1994)
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant GuildJournal of Political Economy, 102
-
P. Mahoney (1997)
The Exchange as RegulatorVirginia Law Review, 83
-
B. Benson (1990)
The Enterprise of Law -
D. Klein (1990)
The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early AmericaEconomic Inquiry, 28
-
S. Rosen (1981)
The Economics of SuperstarsAmerican Economic Review, 71
-
G. Gorton, D. Mullineaux (1987)
The Joint Production of Confidence: Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank ClearinghousesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 19
-
D. Bernheim, M. Whinston (1985)
Common Marketing Agencies as a Device for Facilitating CollusionRand Journal of Economics, 16
-
S. J. Liebowitz (1994)
Network Externality: An Uncommon TragedyJournal of Economic Perspectives, 8
-
C. A. A. National (2000)
NCAA Division I Manual 2000-2001 -
V. L. Smith (1980)
Experiments with a Decentralized Mechanism for Public Good DecisionsAmerican Economic Review, 70
-
B. Benson (1993)
The Impetus for Recognizing Private Property and Adopting Ethical Behavior in a Market Economy: Natural Law, Government Law, or Evolving Self-InterestReview of Austrian Economics, 6
-
S. Banner (1998)
The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791-1860Journal of Legal Studies, 27
-
G. Libecap, S. Wiggins (1984)
Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil ProductionAmerican Economic Review, 74
-
C. Goodhart (1988)
The Evolution of Central Banks -
A. Greif, P. Milgrom, B. R. Weingast (1994)
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant GuildJournal of Political Economy, 102
-
D. Sutter (1995)
Asymmetric Power Relations and Cooperation in AnarchySouthern Economic Journal, 61
-
P. Mahoney (1997)
The Exchange as RegulatorVirginia Law Review, 83
-
G. Tullock (1981)
The Rhetoric and Reality of RedistributionSouthern Economic Journal, 47
-
D. Sutter (1995)
Asymmetric Power Relations and Cooperation in AnarchySouthern Economic Journal, 61
-
S. Salop (1991)
Policy Watch: Antitrust Goes to CollegeJournal of Economic Perspectives, 5
-
R. Fort, J. Quirk (1995)
Cross-Subsidization, Incentives, and Outcomes in Professional Sports LeaguesJournal of Economic Literature, 33
-
G. Tullock (1981)
The Rhetoric and Reality of RedistributionSouthern Economic Journal, 47
-
D. Bernheim (1985)
Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating CollusionRand Journal of Economics, 16
-
D. Carlton, A. Frankel (1995)
The Antitrust Economics of Payment Card NetworksAntitrust Law Journal, 63
-
A. Dewing (1914)
Corporate Promotions and Reorganizations -
L. Telser (1980)
A Theory of Self-Enforcing AgreementsJournal of Business, 53
-
D. Gabel (1994)
Competition in a Network Industry: The Telephone Industry, 1894–1910Journal of Economic History, 54
-
W. Neale (1964)
The Peculiar Economics of Professional SportsQuarterly Journal of Economics, 78
-
M. Katz (1994)
Systems Competition and Network EffectsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 8
-
S. Coate, G. Loury (1993)
Will Affirmative-Action Policies Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?American Economic Review, 83
-
J. Veitch (1986)
Repudiations and Confiscations by the Medieval StateJournal of Economic History, 46
-
D. Evans, R. Schmalensee (1999)
Paying with Plastic: The Digital Revolution in Buying and Borrowing -
D. Friedman (1989)
The Machinery of Freedom, Guide to Radical Capitalism -
A. Greif (1993)
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' CoalitionAmerican Economic Review, 83
-
D. Evans, R. Schmalensee (1995)
Economic Aspects of Payment Card Systems and Antitrust Policy Toward Joint VenturesAntitrust Law Journal, 63
-
T. Cowen (1994)
Rejoinder to David Friedman on the Economics of AnarchyEconomics and Philosophy, 10
-
D. Klein (1990)
THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS? THE TURNPIKE COMPANIES OF EARLY AMERICAEconomic Inquiry, 28
-
C. Calomiris, C. Kahn (1991)
The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking ArrangementsAmerican Economic Review, 81
-
D. Evans (1995)
Antitrust Law Journal, 63
-
C. Calomiris (1990)
Is Deposit Insurance Necessary? A Historical PerspectiveJournal of Economic History, 50
-
T. Cowen (1992)
Law as a Public Good: The Economics of AnarchyEconomics and Philosophy, 8
-
E. Stringham (2002)
Journal of Private Enterprise, 17
-
B. Benson (1998)
To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice -
S. Banner (1998)
The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860Journal of Legal Studies, 27
-
B. Benson (1993)
The impetus for recognizing private property and adopting ethical behavior in a market economy: Natural law, government law, or evolving self-interestReview of Austrian Economics, 6
-
E. Stringham (2003)
The extralegal development of securities trading in seventeenth-century AmsterdamQuarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43
-
(1974)
Government and the Sports Business -
T. Cowen (1999)
The Costs of CooperationThe Review of Austrian Economics, 12
-
M. N. Rothbard (1978)
For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto -
O. M. W. Sprague (1910)
History of Crisis Under the National Banking System -
D. Hock (1999)
Birth of the Chaordic Age -
M. Katz, C. Shapiro (1994)
Systems Competition and Network EffectsJournal of Economic Perspectives, 8
-
J. G. Cannon (1910)
Clearing Houses -
F. McChesney, W. Shughart (1995)
The Causes and Consequences of Antitrust: The Public-Choice Perspective -
K. Dowd (1994)
Competitive Banking, Bankers' Clubs, and Bank RegulationJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 26
- Publisher
- Springer Journals
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
- Subject
- Economics; Public Finance; Political Science; History of Economic Thought/Methodology
- ISSN
- 0889-3047
- eISSN
- 1573-7128
- DOI
- 10.1023/A:1027393021392
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
There is a tension between libertarians' optimism about private supply of public goods and skepticism of the viability of voluntary collusion (Cowen 1992, Cowen and Sutter 1999). Playing off this asymmetry, Cowen (1992) advances the novel argument that the “free market in defense services” favored by anarcho-capitalists is a network industry where collusion is especially feasible. The current article dissolves Cowen's asymmetry, showing that he fails to distinguish between self-enforcing and non-self-enforcing interaction. Case study evidence on network behavior before and after antitrust supports our analysis. Furthermore, libertarians' joint beliefs on public goods and collusion are, contrary to Cowen and Sutter (1999), theoretically defensible.
Journal
The Review of Austrian Economics – Springer Journals
Published: Oct 4, 2004