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Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments

Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis CrossRef

Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments

The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 25 (2): 143 – Jun 1, 1990

Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers: The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments

The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 25 (2): 143 – Jun 1, 1990

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Publisher
CrossRef
ISSN
0022-1090
DOI
10.2307/2330821
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Journal

The Journal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisCrossRef

Published: Jun 1, 1990

There are no references for this article.