When does inferring reputation probability countervail temptation in cooperative behaviors for the prisoners’ dilemma game?

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Dai, Yu; Lu, Peng

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals , Volume 78: 238-244 – Sep 1, 2015

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Dai, Yu; Lu, Peng

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals , Volume 78: 238-244 – Sep 1, 2015

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