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An inductive argument for other minds

An inductive argument for other minds PETER RAY (Received 17 December, 1974) I observe that certain states of my body and certain of my words and actions are commonly accompanied by certain sensations and mental activities of mine. I also observe that Smith is often in similar physical states, utters similar words and performs similar actions. But I do not observe, in the same sense, that Smith's physical states and activities are correlated with feelings and thoughts on his part. He could be a mindless robot, as far as my observation goes. Nevertheless, I have no reason to think that he is a mindless robot, and his observable activities do so closely resemble the ones I engage in when I have thoughts and sensa- tions. So Smith, so much like me in the one respect, is probably like me in the other. He probably 'has a mind'. Such is the form of the usual analogical argument for the existence of other minds. Although an acceptable version of the argument may some- day be found, w;rsions that have so far been offered seem to be vulner- able to at least two of the attacks philosophers have made on them. First, the sample is restricted. The number http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophical Studies Springer Journals

An inductive argument for other minds

Ray, Peter
Philosophical Studies , Volume 29 (2) – Sep 4, 2004
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Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright
Subject
Philosophy; Philosophy, general; Epistemology; Philosophy of Mind; Ethics; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Language
ISSN
0031-8116
eISSN
1573-0883
DOI
10.1007/BF00355289
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

PETER RAY (Received 17 December, 1974) I observe that certain states of my body and certain of my words and actions are commonly accompanied by certain sensations and mental activities of mine. I also observe that Smith is often in similar physical states, utters similar words and performs similar actions. But I do not observe, in the same sense, that Smith's physical states and activities are correlated with feelings and thoughts on his part. He could be a mindless robot, as far as my observation goes. Nevertheless, I have no reason to think that he is a mindless robot, and his observable activities do so closely resemble the ones I engage in when I have thoughts and sensa- tions. So Smith, so much like me in the one respect, is probably like me in the other. He probably 'has a mind'. Such is the form of the usual analogical argument for the existence of other minds. Although an acceptable version of the argument may some- day be found, w;rsions that have so far been offered seem to be vulner- able to at least two of the attacks philosophers have made on them. First, the sample is restricted. The number

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Philosophical Studies – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 4, 2004

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