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C ommitment to a P rocess I nnovation : N ucor , USX, and T hin ‐S lab C asting

C ommitment to a P rocess I nnovation : N ucor , USX, and T hin ‐S lab C asting This paper studies the order of adoption of a process innovation, thin‐slab casting, by U.S. steel makers. A game‐theoretic model of technology adoption with capacity constraints indicates that incumbents are likely to trail entrants in adopting process technologies that reduce the minimal scale required to compete. Evidence from the case study also indicates, however, that the sorts of interactive effects emphasized by game‐theoretic models may be dominated by the effects of competitors' heterogeneous precommitments. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Economics & Management Strategy Wiley

C ommitment to a P rocess I nnovation : N ucor , USX, and T hin ‐S lab C asting

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References (10)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
Copyright © 1993 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
1058-6407
eISSN
1530-9134
DOI
10.1111/j.1430-9134.1993.00135.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper studies the order of adoption of a process innovation, thin‐slab casting, by U.S. steel makers. A game‐theoretic model of technology adoption with capacity constraints indicates that incumbents are likely to trail entrants in adopting process technologies that reduce the minimal scale required to compete. Evidence from the case study also indicates, however, that the sorts of interactive effects emphasized by game‐theoretic models may be dominated by the effects of competitors' heterogeneous precommitments.

Journal

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy – Wiley

Published: Mar 1, 1993

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