Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence

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Chen, Charles J.P.; Li, Zengquan; Su, Xijia; Sun, Zheng

Journal of Corporate Finance , Volume 17 (2): 229-243 – Apr 1, 2011

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Chen, Charles J.P.; Li, Zengquan; Su, Xijia; Sun, Zheng

Journal of Corporate Finance , Volume 17 (2): 229-243 – Apr 1, 2011

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