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Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession

Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession This paper follows an institutional theory of action in exploring the consequences of formal and informal rules on the chief executive officer (CEO) succession process. An analysis of the competing risks of insider versus outsider CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations provides evidence that boards rely on both past precedents and formal internal labor markets for executive succession and the selection of insiders versus outsiders as CEOs. To exclude alternative explanations that view rules as epiphenomenal, I examine the moderating effects of performance, late CEO departures, the founder's power, and board structure on reliance on rules. The results show substantial inertia in the rules of CEO succession, consistent with an institutionalized action perspective. The findings suggest that rules both enable and constrain board decision making. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Administrative Science Quarterly SAGE

Institutionalized Action and Corporate Governance: The Reliance on Rules of CEO Succession

Administrative Science Quarterly , Volume 44 (2): 33 – Jun 1, 1999

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References (60)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
© 1999 Johnson Graduate School, Cornell University
ISSN
0001-8392
eISSN
1930-3815
DOI
10.2307/2667000
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

This paper follows an institutional theory of action in exploring the consequences of formal and informal rules on the chief executive officer (CEO) succession process. An analysis of the competing risks of insider versus outsider CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations provides evidence that boards rely on both past precedents and formal internal labor markets for executive succession and the selection of insiders versus outsiders as CEOs. To exclude alternative explanations that view rules as epiphenomenal, I examine the moderating effects of performance, late CEO departures, the founder's power, and board structure on reliance on rules. The results show substantial inertia in the rules of CEO succession, consistent with an institutionalized action perspective. The findings suggest that rules both enable and constrain board decision making.

Journal

Administrative Science QuarterlySAGE

Published: Jun 1, 1999

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