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Positive Accounting Theory
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1997 Wiley Subscription Services
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- eISSN
- 1099-1468
- DOI
- 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199711/12)18:7/8<587::AID-MDE855>3.0.CO;2-R
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
One of the fundamental purposes of corporate accounting is to facilitate the monitoring of managers. Since managers are instrumental in the production of accounting numbers, and since it is costly to monitor their behavior in this regard, firms sometimes report fraudulent accounting numbers. This paper tests several hypotheses concerning why some firms, and not others, commit accounting fraud. This is accomplished through examination of a sample of 62 firms charged with disclosure violations by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) during the period 1981–1987. We also examine whether directors of companies that commit accounting fraud are disciplined in the managerial labor market.
Journal
Managerial and Decision Economics – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 1997