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Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: a counterproductive strategy?

Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: a counterproductive strategy? Social network analysis has been adopted by a number of governments in their counterinsurgency campaigns. By using network analysis, security agencies claim they can render militant groups impotent by targeting ‘nodal points’ or key links in insurgent networks. The article makes three arguments on the potentially counterproductive nature of social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaigns. Firstly, social network analysis may be ‘too successful’ in stripping militant movements of a cadre who could negotiate a peace accord. Secondly, social network analysis-assisted campaigns fail to address the root causes of violent conflict. Thirdly, by denuding communities of social capital and social entrepreneurs, social network analysis – as a counterinsurgency tool – may condemn communities to underdevelopment and failed post-war reconstruction. In short, the ‘magic weapon’ of social network analysis might actually prolong the conflict it is supposed to help quell. The article employs the government of Sri Lanka's social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaign as a case study, though it also has application to other cases. It concludes by considering if social network analysis can be put to more constructive uses, specifically in the rebuilding of communities after violent conflict. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Critical Studies on Terrorism Taylor & Francis

Social network analysis and counterinsurgency: a counterproductive strategy?

Mac Ginty, Roger
Critical Studies on Terrorism , Volume 3 (2): 18 – Aug 13, 2010
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Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Copyright
Copyright Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN
1753-9161
eISSN
1753-9153
DOI
10.1080/17539153.2010.491319
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Social network analysis has been adopted by a number of governments in their counterinsurgency campaigns. By using network analysis, security agencies claim they can render militant groups impotent by targeting ‘nodal points’ or key links in insurgent networks. The article makes three arguments on the potentially counterproductive nature of social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaigns. Firstly, social network analysis may be ‘too successful’ in stripping militant movements of a cadre who could negotiate a peace accord. Secondly, social network analysis-assisted campaigns fail to address the root causes of violent conflict. Thirdly, by denuding communities of social capital and social entrepreneurs, social network analysis – as a counterinsurgency tool – may condemn communities to underdevelopment and failed post-war reconstruction. In short, the ‘magic weapon’ of social network analysis might actually prolong the conflict it is supposed to help quell. The article employs the government of Sri Lanka's social network analysis-assisted counterinsurgency campaign as a case study, though it also has application to other cases. It concludes by considering if social network analysis can be put to more constructive uses, specifically in the rebuilding of communities after violent conflict.

Journal

Critical Studies on Terrorism – Taylor & Francis

Published: Aug 13, 2010

Keywords: social network analysis (SNA); counterinsurgency; peace-building; post-war reconstruction; Sri Lanka

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