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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- Copyright © 2004 Wiley Subscription Services
- ISSN
- 0002-9246
- eISSN
- 1536-7150
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2004.00277.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
Abstract. The logical foundations of constitutional government are of basic importance if people are to be self‐governing. All forms of political order are Faustian bargains subject to numerous risks. If constitutional choice applies to all patterns of human association, the complexity of associated relationships and the potential threats to the viability of associated relationships in the aggregate exceed the limits of human cognition. The development of analytical capabilities depends on using frameworks, theories, and models for formulating hypotheses about conditions and consequences, undertaking diagnostic assessments, and conceptualizing and designing alternative possibilities. The relationship of ideas to deeds in an experimental epistemology is necessary to achieve a warrantable art and science of association.
Journal
American Journal of Economics and Sociology – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2004