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Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game

Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game Collective efforts are a trademark of both insect and human societies 1 . They are achieved through relatedness in the former 2 and unknown mechanisms in the latter. The problem of achieving cooperation among non-kin has been described as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, prophesying the inescapable collapse of many human enterprises 3,4 . In public goods experiments, initial cooperation usually drops quickly to almost zero 5 . It can be maintained by the opportunity to punish defectors 6 or the need to maintain good reputation 7 . Both schemes require that defectors are identified. Theorists propose that a simple but effective mechanism operates under full anonymity. With optional participation in the public goods game, ‘loners’ (players who do not join the group), defectors and cooperators will coexist through rock–paper–scissors dynamics 8,9 . Here we show experimentally that volunteering generates these dynamics in public goods games and that manipulating initial conditions can produce each predicted direction. If, by manipulating displayed decisions, it is pretended that defectors have the highest frequency, loners soon become most frequent, as do cooperators after loners and defectors after cooperators. On average, cooperation is perpetuated at a substantial level. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Nature Springer Journals

Volunteering leads to rock–paper–scissors dynamics in a public goods game

Semmann, Dirk; Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen; Milinski, Manfred
Nature , Volume 425 (6956) – Sep 25, 2003
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References (38)

Publisher
Springer Journals
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 by Macmillan Magazines Ltd.
Subject
Science, Humanities and Social Sciences, multidisciplinary; Science, Humanities and Social Sciences, multidisciplinary; Science, multidisciplinary
ISSN
0028-0836
eISSN
1476-4687
DOI
10.1038/nature01986
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Collective efforts are a trademark of both insect and human societies 1 . They are achieved through relatedness in the former 2 and unknown mechanisms in the latter. The problem of achieving cooperation among non-kin has been described as the ‘tragedy of the commons’, prophesying the inescapable collapse of many human enterprises 3,4 . In public goods experiments, initial cooperation usually drops quickly to almost zero 5 . It can be maintained by the opportunity to punish defectors 6 or the need to maintain good reputation 7 . Both schemes require that defectors are identified. Theorists propose that a simple but effective mechanism operates under full anonymity. With optional participation in the public goods game, ‘loners’ (players who do not join the group), defectors and cooperators will coexist through rock–paper–scissors dynamics 8,9 . Here we show experimentally that volunteering generates these dynamics in public goods games and that manipulating initial conditions can produce each predicted direction. If, by manipulating displayed decisions, it is pretended that defectors have the highest frequency, loners soon become most frequent, as do cooperators after loners and defectors after cooperators. On average, cooperation is perpetuated at a substantial level.

Journal

Nature – Springer Journals

Published: Sep 25, 2003

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