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Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals

Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals H. Igor Ansoff Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals If we could first know where we are and whither we are crisis highlighted the danger of strategic business tending, we could better judge what to do and how to surprises. But such surprises had overtaken do it. numerous firms, one by one, from the early Abraham Lincoln, 1858 1950s-enough of them to provide material for a Everything (before the Arab oil embargo) is history. . . Fortune book titled Corporations in Crisis. The future is a whole new game. Irving Shapiro, Du Pont Company, 1975 In the aftermath, it was argued that these cor­ Neither past experience nor academic training has pre­ porations were caught unaware because they pared many younger managers for such reversal in the lacked modem forecasting and planning systems. approach to business planning and operation. But in the 1970s a majority of the firms caught John T. Hackett, Cummings Engine Company, 1975 by the petroleum crisis had such systems. In the mid-1960s, the management of one of the world's largest conglomerates proudly displayed The paradox of strategic military surprise has its planning and control. A week after the public been a familiar phenomenon http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png California Management Review SAGE

Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals

Ansoff, H. Igor
California Management Review , Volume 18 (2): 13 – Dec 1, 1975
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References (4)

Publisher
SAGE
Copyright
© 1975 The Regents of the University of California
ISSN
0008-1256
eISSN
2162-8564
DOI
10.2307/41164635
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

H. Igor Ansoff Managing Strategic Surprise by Response to Weak Signals If we could first know where we are and whither we are crisis highlighted the danger of strategic business tending, we could better judge what to do and how to surprises. But such surprises had overtaken do it. numerous firms, one by one, from the early Abraham Lincoln, 1858 1950s-enough of them to provide material for a Everything (before the Arab oil embargo) is history. . . Fortune book titled Corporations in Crisis. The future is a whole new game. Irving Shapiro, Du Pont Company, 1975 In the aftermath, it was argued that these cor­ Neither past experience nor academic training has pre­ porations were caught unaware because they pared many younger managers for such reversal in the lacked modem forecasting and planning systems. approach to business planning and operation. But in the 1970s a majority of the firms caught John T. Hackett, Cummings Engine Company, 1975 by the petroleum crisis had such systems. In the mid-1960s, the management of one of the world's largest conglomerates proudly displayed The paradox of strategic military surprise has its planning and control. A week after the public been a familiar phenomenon

Journal

California Management Review – SAGE

Published: Dec 1, 1975

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