Reward crowdfunding contribution as planned behaviour: An extended framework

Rotem Shneor; Ziaul Haque Munim

doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.06.013

Shneor, Rotem;Munim, Ziaul Haque;

2019-10-01 00:00:00

Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Journal of Business Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbusres Reward crowdfunding contribution as planned behaviour: An extended framework a, b Rotem Shneor , Ziaul Haque Munim Dept. of Strategy and Management, School of Business and Law, University of Agder, Gimlemoen 19, 4630 Kristiansand, Norway Dept. of Maritime Operations, Faculty of Technology, Natural Sciences and Maritime Sciences, University of South Eastern, Norway ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT Keywords: Reward crowdfunding is a popular channel for entrepreneurial fundraising, whereby backers receive non- Crowdfunding monetary benefits in return for monetary contributions while accepting risks of non-delivery on campaign pitch Theory of planned behavior promises. To understand contribution behavior in this context, we apply the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) Attitude for analyzing contribution intentionality and behavior, as well as their antecedents. We use survey data from 560 Self-efficacy users of Finland's leading reward crowdfunding platform– Mesenaatti. Our findings show that an extended TPB Perceived behavioral control model holds for reward crowdfunding and that both financial-contribution intentions and information-sharing Subjective norms intentions predict behavior. This highlights the dual nature of reward crowdfunding-contribution intentions and behavior, where information sharing helps reduce information asymmetry and serves as a quality signal in support of financial contribution. This paper also presents significant differences in attitudes, self-efficacy, fi- nancial contribution and information-sharing intentions between high-sum and low-sum contributors. 1. Introduction recognition to marshaling of resources and capacity development (Shneor & Flåten, 2015). Crowdfunding is an emerging channel for entrepreneurial and Nevertheless, crowdfunding is manifested via a family of different project funding, which has seen exponential growth in recent years, models rather than through a single format. The primary crowdfunding reaching a volume of EUR 262 billion in 2016, a 208% increase from models include lending, equity, reward, and donation. Whereas lending EUR 130 billion in 2015 (Ziegler et al., 2018). Crowdfunding refers to and equity are viewed as investment models, reward and donation are the ability to obtain funding from multiple backers with each backer regarded as non-investment models. Clarifying and elaborating on providing a relatively small amount, instead of raising large sums from Ziegler et al.'s (2018) definitions, the various models may be defined as a few backers (Belleflamme, Lambert, & Schwienbacher, 2014). This follows: In peer-to-peer lending individuals or institutional funders pro- process is usually performed online and often without standard fi- vide loans to borrowers with the expectation of repayment of the nancial intermediaries (Mollick, 2014). principal and a set interest within a certain timeframe. In equity Crowdfunding can be viewed as community-enabled financing, crowdfunding individuals or institutional funders buy an ownership drawing on the principles of crowdsourcing, while being adapted into stake in a company or organization. In reward crowdfunding backers the context of fundraising (Macht & Weatherston, 2015). Thanks to its provide funding to individuals, projects, or organizations in exchange anchoring in communities, crowdfunding incorporates advantages be- for non-monetary rewards, products, or services. And, finally, in do- yond the actual sums raised from interested members. Such benefits nation crowdfunding backers provide funding based on philanthropic or include access to valuable and timely feedback, knowledge and tech- civic motivations with no expectation of monetary or material reward. nology to concepts under development (Gerber & Hui, 2013; Nucciarelli However, while the above review captures the four core models, var- et al., 2017), demonstration of project legitimacy (Frydrych, Bock, iations and combinations of them do exist (Ziegler et al., 2018). Kinder, & Koeck, 2014), as well as direct access to, and interaction with, A popular channel for entrepreneurs to raise funding for their multiple stakeholders such as prospective customers, business partners, ventures is reward crowdfunding. In 2016, reward crowdfunding vo- media, existing, future funders, etc. (Mollick & Kuppuswamy, 2014). lumes were estimated at EUR 191 million in Europe (Ziegler et al., Moreover, from an entrepreneurial perspective, crowdfunding may be 2018), USD 598 million in the Americas (Ziegler et al., 2017), and USD used throughout the entrepreneurial process, from opportunity 2.08 billion in Asia-Pacific (Garvey et al., 2017). Reward crowdfunding Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (R. Shneor), [email protected] (Z.H. Munim). https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.06.013 Received 4 August 2018; Received in revised form 7 June 2019; Accepted 8 June 2019 Available online 18 June 2019 0148-2963/ © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/). R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 represents a unique offering. On the one hand, it does not offer a collected from 560 users of the Finnish leading national reward plat- monetary reward for risks taken, as in the case of investment. However, form: Mesenaatti. Finland offers an interesting context of study, as it is on the other hand, it represents financial transactions that are asso- considered one of Europe's leading countries in terms of crowdfunding ciated with the relatively high risks of full or partial non-delivery, as volumes and regulatory friendliness (Ziegler et al., 2018). Examination well as late or deviating delivery with respect to the original campaign of users of a national platform from a small open economy represents an pitch promises. Moreover, pre-sales via reward crowdfunding resembles interesting complementary window on to crowdfunding dynamics a business-plan pitching more than traditional advertisements, as their transpiring outside large global platforms (such as Kickstarter and In- focus is on demonstrating legitimacy (Frydrych et al., 2014). Also, si- diegogo), which have been a popular research context for earlier studies milar to traditional entrepreneurial fundraising, campaign success de- (Short et al., 2017). pends on successful leveraging of social capital within the en- Overall, our findings support the conceptual application of our ex- trepreneur's network (Butticè, Colombo, & Wright, 2017; Colombo, tended TPB framework in the reward crowdfunding context and high- Franzoni, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2015; Skirnevskiy, Bendig, & Brettel, light the importance of two intentional components - financial con- 2017). tribution and information sharing - in predicting crowdfunding Thus far, crowdfunding research has focused primarily on under- behavior. Specifically, we found that attitudes, self-efficacy, and sub- standing the factors that impact campaign success and failure (Short, jective norms positively affect financial contribution intentions. Ketchen, McKenny, Allison, & Ireland, 2017). Some of this research has Surprisingly, perceived behavior control was found to have a negative begun to address the backer's perspectives and their motivations for effect on intentions. In addition, attitudes and subjective norms were engaging in and financially backing crowdfunding campaigns (Macht & found to have a positive effect on information sharing intentions. Weatherston, 2015). Another area beginning to draw research attention Financial contribution intentions were found to affect information has been post-pledging satisfaction with the crowdfunding process and sharing intentions positively, and both these intentions had a positive outcomes (Xu, Zheng, Xu, & Wang, 2016). Accordingly, recent litera- effect on financial contribution behavior. When splitting the sample ture reviews have highlighted the need to further address the backers' into high- and low-sum contributors in a post-hoc test, we found that perspectives and psychology (McKenny, Allison, Ketchen, Short, & high-sum contributors exhibited significantly higher levels of attitudes, Ireland, 2017). These reviews acknowledge that the nature of backers' self-efficacy, as well as both financial-contribution and information- perspectives depends on the crowdfunding model examined, as moti- sharing intentions than did small-sum contributors. vations for backing non-investment versus investment crowdfunding The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first present campaigns are likely to be driven by different antecedents (Belleflamme a review of the literature regarding the backers' perspectives and re- et al., 2014; Macht & Weatherston, 2015; Mollick, 2014; Ordanini, lated psychological aspects in crowdfunding. We then develop a list of Miceli, Pizzetti, & Parasuraman, 2011). These notions are further sup- hypotheses aimed at testing the relevance of an extended TPB frame- ported by claims that understanding the crowd is fundamental to un- work in the context of reward crowdfunding contribution behavior. derstanding crowdfunding, much like understanding angel investors Subsequently, we present our findings and discuss them in light of and venture capital are fundamental to understanding traditional in- earlier research. Finally, we conclude by highlighting key contribu- vestment (Josefy, Dean, Albert, & Fitza, 2017). tions, limitations and implications for research and practice. The current paper seeks to address this gap by introducing a cog- nitive perspective into understanding crowdfunding behavior. Such an 2. Literature review approach recognizes that everything we do is influenced by mental processes through which we acquire, transform, and use information. Crowdfunding research has focused on analyzing factors that impact Specifically, we sought to analyze contribution behavior in the context campaign success and failure (Short et al., 2017), some of which serve of the reward crowdfunding model, while examining it as a planned as bridges to understanding the backers' perspective of crowdfunding behavior. This is achieved by studying the extent to which the Theory of contribution behavior (Macht & Weatherston, 2015). The limited re- Planned Behavior (hereafter, TPB) (Ajzen, 1991) can be used to capture search that has addressed the backers' perspectives, independent of crowdfunding contribution intentionality and behavior, as well as their campaign outcomes (that is, success and failure), collectively suggest antecedents. Here, the assumption is that, due to the relative novelty of that backers' in non-investment crowdfunding models are driven by its digital manifestation, the importance of risks involved, and its fi- several sources of motivation: the desire to collect rewards, help others, nancial implications for participants, individuals are unlikely to engage support causes, and community belonging (Burtch, Ghose, & Wattal, in crowdfunding contribution behavior without at least some pre- 2013; Gerber & Hui, 2013; Ordanini et al., 2011; Ryu & Kim, 2016). liminary consideration. In examining contribution intentionality and Backers in investment crowdfunding models are shown to be motivated behavior, we answer earlier calls to strengthen the budding literature by supporting entrepreneurs, prospective financial returns, enhancing on motivational factors in crowdfunding behavior. To date, research their image, lobbying for campaigns serving their needs, and achieving has mostly ignored the prospective influence of cognitive antecedents direct contact with related ventures (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017; in crowdfunding contribution behavior. Cumming & Johan, 2013; Ordanini et al., 2011). Furthermore, a recent Furthermore, we extend the generic TPB framework by acknowl- study of equity crowdfunding backers has also revealed that herding edging the dual nature of crowdfunding behavior as driven by inten- has a significant moderating effect on backers' reward motivation tions to make financial contributions as well as intentions to share (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017). campaign information with others. Financial contribution intention is A study by Cholakova and Clarysse (2015), including both invest- defined here as an individual's intent to provide monetary backing to a ment and non-investment crowdfunding models, found that financial crowdfunding campaign. Information sharing intention is defined here rewards were the primary motivator behind an individual's decision to as an individual's intent to share information about a crowdfunding pledge, while non-financial motivations played only a secondary role. An campaign with others in their social and professional networks. Since additional study, conducted in the investment context of equity crowd- crowdfunding behavior is anchored in social media interactions and funding, identified three clusters of investors, as defined by their moti- users' exposure to online Word-of-Mouth (hereafter, WoM) (Castillo, vation to back equity crowdfunding campaigns in Finland (Lukkarinen, Petrie, & Wardell, 2014; Colombo et al., 2015; Feller, Gleasure, & Wallenius, & Seppälä, 2017). The clusters included donation-oriented Treacy, 2017; Lehner, 2014), we incorporate both information sharing supporters, who are predominantly motivated by the opportunity to and financial contribution intentions into an extended TPB model participate and help; return-oriented supporters, who are motivated by adapted to the reward crowdfunding context. both financial returns and opportunity to participate and help; and pure Accordingly, the current study presents an analysis of survey data investors, who are motivated predominantly by financial returns. 57 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 An additional line of inquiry includes a few studies that explored or she views the behavior favorably. PBC is the individual's perception factors impacting intentionality in the context of crowdfunding. Kang, of how easy or difficult the performance of a certain behavior is, cap- Gao, Wang, and Zheng (2016) built on the cognitive basis of trust ap- turing the extent to which he or she views themselves as having the proach (Hooghe, Marien, & de Vroome, 2012) and examined the in- capacity to perform it. Subjective norms are the individual's beliefs vestment willingness of investors on two Chinese equity platforms. about whether significant others think he or she should engage in the Kang et al.'s (2016) findings indicate that both calculus trust and re- behavior and are assumed to capture the extent of perceived social lationship trust directly affect willingness to invest. Furthermore both pressures exerted on individuals to engage in a certain behavior. types of trust were found to mediate the effects of network externality One aspect of conceptual fine-tuning relates to PBC. While the ori- (project value increases the more investors join), informativeness ginal conceptualization of PBC resembled that of self-efficacy (Bandura, (provision of sufficient information), perceived accreditation (efforts 1982), thanks to its focus on perceptions of one's own ability to perform taken to verify capital needs), third-party seal (certification of docu- a behavior, later literature has argued that a dimension capturing one's ments), and social interaction ties (tie strength and communication belief about the extent to which the outcome of a behavior can be in- frequency) on willingness to invest. A different study (Zhao, Chen, fluenced by one's own efforts should be acknowledged and treated se- Wang, & Chen, 2017), built on social exchange theory (Homans, 1958), parately (Manstead & Eekelen, 1998; Terry & O'Leary, 1995). This ar- examined backers on a Taiwanese reward crowdfunding platform, gument was made by linkage to diverse sources of control, where self- finding that backers' commitment to the project as well as the project's efficacy relates to internal controls such as ability and motivation, perceived risk positively impacted funding intentions. while PBC relates to external controls such as task difficulty, access to Furthermore, a recent study (Daskalakis & Wei, 2017) examined the resources, securing cooperation of others, and luck. effects of different risk perceptions on investment willingness in equity Another conceptual consideration relates to the empirical identifi- and lending crowdfunding of respondents from Spain, Germany, and cation of two types of subjective norms: injunctive and descriptive Poland. Investing equity investments, the study revealed that concerns norms. According to Manning (2009), injunctive norms relate to social about fraudulent borrowers had a negative impact on investment pressure to engage in a behavior based on the perception of what other willingness in Germany, with similar effect regarding concerns about people want you to do (termed here as subjective norms). Descriptive fraudulent platforms in Spain and Poland, and concerns about poor norms relate to social pressure to engage in a behavior based on the campaign information in Poland. Moreover, with respect to lending, observed or inferred behavior of others (termed here as social norms). significant effects were identified only in Poland, where concerns with For the current crowdfunding context, then, one way to capture in- fraudulent borrowers and fraudulent platforms negatively impacted ferred behavior of others may be through commentary made by experts investment willingness. and media on crowdfunding practice and experiences. While the ori- ginal conceptualization was that of an injunctive norm (Ajzen, 1991), it 2.1. Theory of planned behavior (TPB) was recently recommended to incorporate both types of normative measures should be included in planned behavior studies (Ajzen & We wish to contribute to this line of research by theoretically an- Fishbein, 2005). Accordingly, we examined both subjective and social choring it in the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991). Thus, to norms in the present study. pursue this approach, we regard crowdfunding contribution behavior as a planned behavior as are the roles played by its antecedents. The as- 2.2. Reward crowdfunding contribution intention sumption, then, is that due to the relative novelty of crowdfunding's digital manifestations and its financial implications for participants, The TPB has been widely used to examine the adoption of other individuals are not likely to engage in contributing to crowdfunding Internet-based services and Internet-mediated marketplaces by pro- campaigns without at least some preliminary consideration. Specifi- spective users in many contexts: participation in online communities cally, the research discussed above identified risks, commitment, and (Casaló, Flavián, & Guinalíu, 2010), acceptance of e-services (M.-H. Hsu trust as explaining willingness to back crowdfunding campaigns & Chiu, 2004), adoption of e-commerce (Grandón, Nasco, & Mykytyn, (Daskalakis & Wei, 2017; Kang et al., 2016; Zhao et al., 2017). The 2011), adoption of e-banking (Shih & Fang, 2004), Internet purchasing studies also suggested both volitional control and a need for intention (George, 2004), online shopping (M.-H. Hsu, Yen, Chiu, & Chang, as precursors to crowdfunding contribution behavior. Accordingly, 2006), online trading (Gopi & Ramayah, 2007), online social net- adopting the TPB framework further enhances our understanding of working (Baker & White, 2010), spreading of e-WoM (Fu, Ju, & Hsu, intentionality in the context of crowdfunding contribution behavior and 2015), co-creating in social media (M. F. Y. Cheung & To, 2016), its antecedents. playing online games (Lee, 2009), and watching in-app mobile adver- At its core, the TPB suggests that the likelihood of an individual tisements (M. F. Y. Cheung & To, 2017). performing a particular behavior is affected by that individual's inten- Based on these robust findings indicating the applicability of the tion to engage in such behavior (Ajzen, 1991). According to Ajzen, TPB framework for explaining user behavior in various digitally intentions capture the motivational factors influencing a behavior, in- mediated marketplaces and networking sites, we introduce the TPB into dicating how hard one is willing to try and how much effort one plans the context of contributor behavior in the crowdfunding context in to exert in order to perform a behavior. While later meta-analyses have general, and the reward crowdfunding context in particular. Since confirmed the important link between intentions and behaviors has crowdfunding contribution behavior is within an individual's volitional been confirmed in later meta-analyses (Armitage & Conner, 2001; control and also requires some level of pre-consideration in light of its Sheeran, 2002), intentions can only find expression in behavior if a various risks, we consider TPB to be a suitable theoretical framework person is free to decide whether or not to perform the behavior (Ajzen, for analyzing its antecedents. By applying the TPB, we seek to enhance 1991). Hence, the TPB represents an extension of the Theory of Rea- our understanding of factors contributing to the development of in- soned Action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), which was deemed less ade- tentions in addition to contribution behavior and complement the quate for dealing with behaviors over which people have incomplete limited research on motivational factors in crowdfunding behavior. volitional control (Ajzen, 1991). Moreover, building on the notion that crowdfunding behavior in- The TPB further suggests that intention to engage in a behavior is corporates both financial transactions and social information sharing affected by several subjective positions: one's attitude towards the be- within an online community context (Colombo et al., 2015; Lawton & havior, perceived behavioral control (PBC), and perception of sub- Marom, 2012; Lehner, 2014; Shneor & Flåten, 2015), we suggest a jective norms (SUBN) (Ajzen, 1991). Attitudes are the overall evalua- theoretical extension that is specifically adapted to this context by tions of the behavior by the individual, capturing the extent to which he distinguishing between financial-contribution intentions and 58 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 information-sharing intentions as antecedents of crowdfunding fi- crowdfunding engagements, one can consider capabilities to secure nancial-contribution behavior. resources and cooperation of others for direct financial contribution or We define financial-contribution intention as an individual's inten- indirect contribution by sharing information about the campaign with tion to provide monetary backing to a crowdfunding campaign. We also others who can contribute to it. Accordingly, we hypothesize the fol- define information-sharing intention as an individual's intention to lowing: share information about a crowdfunding campaign with others in their H2. The greater the individual's self-efficacy regarding crowdfunding social and professional networks (e.g., via social media, e-mail corre- engagement, the higher the individual's levels of financial-contribution spondence, and conversation). Information about campaigns may en- intentions (H2a), and the higher the crowdfunding information-sharing compass several aspects. Examples of these aspects include campaign intentions (H2b). objectives, timeline, concept and business descriptions, rewards and incentives, links to detailed information, subjective evaluations of at- H3. The greater the individual's perceived behavior control regarding tractiveness, as well as indications about one's own intention to con- crowdfunding engagement, the higher the individual's levels of tribute or actual contributions made to the campaign. financial contribution intentions (H3a), and the higher the More specifically, we argue for the importance of adding the in- crowdfunding information-sharing intentions (H3b). formation-sharing dimension based on the following considerations. Furthermore, the extent to which individuals are willing to con- Since reward crowdfunding involves risks of non-delivery, late delivery, tribute to a crowdfunding campaign depends on the extent to which or deviating delivery on promises made by campaigners, such situations their social environment encourages them to do so (subjective norm) can be characterized by relatively high information asymmetries. Since and the extent to which others' contribution to crowdfunding cam- prospective contributors are both exposed to and engaged in crowd- paigns enhances their own willingness to do so (social norms). First, funding contribution opportunities via WoM on social media, WoM can regarding subjective norms, it has been shown that social pressure plays be regarded as a mechanism for reducing information asymmetries an important role in a variety of behaviors in online environments (Fu (Manes & Tchetchik, 2018), as well as an important signal evaluating et al., 2015), donation gift giving (Meer, 2011), as well as purchase attributes of offerings (Lim & Chung, 2011). Indeed, positive WoM was situations (Algesheimer, Dholakia, & Herrmann, 2005). In the same found to be positively associated with investment decisions in crowd- spirit, when applied to crowdfunding, the greater the perceived en- funding contexts (Bi, Liu, & Usman, 2017), and the number of social couragement or pressure to contribute financially, the more likely one media shares was found to be positively associated with campaign is to contribute and to share information about campaigns as a signal of success in both reward (Hobbs, Grigore, & Molesworth, 2016) and their contribution behavior for signaling compliance with social pres- donation crowdfunding (Berliner & Kenworthy, 2017). sures. Second, with respect to social norms, the impact of others' be- Overall, one can consider information sharing as a path for enabling havior has been found to have an impact on contribution behavior indirect financial contributions by influencing others to consider con- through herding effects (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017; Renwick & tributing to crowdfunding campaigns, or to solidify one's own choice to Mossialos, 2017). Hence, one could expect that the more an individual contribute. As noted earlier, the reviewed studies have shown that risk perceives social norms as favorable to crowdfunding contributions, the perception, trust, and commitment influence contributions to crowd- more likely her or she would choose to participate in it and signal to funding campaigns (Daskalakis & Wei, 2017; Lukkarinen et al., 2017; others they are participating in it by sharing information with them. Zhao et al., 2017). Accordingly, one could argue that upon sharing Accordingly, we hypothesize the following: information regarding crowdfunding campaigns, one reduces risk per- ceptions and enhances trust by exposing the crowdfunding campaign to H4. The greater the subjective norms are perceived as favorable to others' scrutiny. Moreover, one's own commitment to contribute is thus crowdfunding engagement, the higher the levels of financial- strengthened. contribution intentions (H4a), and the higher the crowdfunding Hence, applying the extended TPB framework suggested above information-sharing intentions (H4b). would imply that attitudes, PBC, self-efficacy, subjective norms, and H5. The greater the social norms are perceived as favorable to social norms will all serve as antecedents of h intentions to contribute crowdfunding engagement, the higher the levels of financial- financially and share information about crowdfunding campaigns. The contribution intentions (H5a), and the higher the crowdfunding extent to which an individual may be willing to contribute to a information-sharing intentions (H5b). crowdfunding campaign depends on how favorably he or she views such behavior and has positive expectations about performing it. Building on self-presentation theory (Bareket-Bojmel, Moran, & Positive perspectives can promote both one's own intention to con- Shahar, 2016; Schlenker & Leary, 1982), one may suggest that if tribute as well as encourage others to contribute by sharing information crowdfunding contribution can be viewed as conveying a positive social about the campaign with them. Accordingly, we hypothesize the fol- signal, individuals are likely to contribute to crowdfunding campaigns, lowing: at least partly, to enhance their social image. Indeed, earlier findings in the context of prosocial crowdlending show that self-presenting funders H1. The more favorable the attitude towards crowdfunding behavior, exhibit higher levels of visible funding activity in terms of number of the higher the levels of financial-contribution intentions (H1a), and the loans made (Cox et al., 2018). Furthermore, enhancing one's image was higher the crowdfunding information-sharing intentions (H1b). found to be a significant predictor of investment on the German equity The extent to which individuals consider their ability to make fi- crowdfunding platform, Innovestment (Bretschneider & Leimeister, nancial contributions to crowdfunding campaigns can be associated 2017). Alternatively, one could argue that information sharing follows with both internal (self-efficacy) and external controls (PBC). Internal financial-contribution intention as part of strategic self-interest in pro- controls relate to the extent to which individuals consider themselves actively enhancing the likelihood of campaign success, and reception of sufficiently capable and knowledgeable to perform a certain behavior. goods to be ordered via the campaign. Here, earlier studies have shown In the context of crowdfunding engagements, one can consider both that social media engagement with campaign information (Bi et al., capabilities to contribute financially directly or indirectly by sharing 2017) and number of shares of campaign information are associated information about the campaign with others who can contribute to it. with campaign success (Berliner & Kenworthy, 2017; Hobbs et al., Similarly, external controls relate to the extent to which individuals 2016), even though these dynamics may vary across cultures (Cho & consider themselves as able to overcome task difficulties and secure Kim, 2017). Accordingly, we hypothesize the following: access to resources and cooperation with others. Thus, in the context of 59 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 H6. The greater the individual's financial-contribution intentions, the crowdfunding platform -Mesenaatti.me, which has overseen the raising greater the individual's information-sharing intention. of close to EUR 3 million in 504 successful campaigns out of a total of 792 campaigns running between 2013 and 2017 (64% success rate). Finally, by merging these theoretical assumptions with the TPB's Finland represents a small open economy that has embraced crowd- core premises (Ajzen, 1991), we propose that both aspects of in- funding as part of the digitalization of the finance sector and enjoys a tentionality in crowdfunding – financial-contribution and information- relatively crowdfunding-friendly regulatory environment (Gajda, sharing intentions will impact reward crowdfunding contribution be- 2017). In 2015 and 2016, Finland was ranked first among the Nordic havior. The relationship between intentions and behavior has been well countries and fifth in Europe in terms of total volume raised through documented both conceptually and empirically, in a large body of re- crowdfunding and volume raised per capita (Ziegler et al., 2018). search that includes multiple meta-analyses (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Data presented in this paper were part of a larger data collection Sheeran, 2002). However, this relationship may not hold in all contexts effort requiring participants to devote up to 60 min to complete a web- as variations in the antecedents of intention may lead to a situation in based survey using SurveyXact comprising > 400 items. Invitations which intentions may exist but would not be translated to behavior. For were sent to all registered e-mails on the platform, numbering 25,000 example, despite having a favorable attitude and receiving social en- users, regardless of whether these individuals have contributed to a couragement, an individual may lack the knowledge of how to con- campaign. Four reminders were sent between April and May 2016, as tribute financially or lack information about relevant campaigns or lack recommended by Dillman (2006). To partially counter the demanding available resources to contribute, thus, resulting in non-contribution. nature of the survey and to encourage respondents to participate, par- Similarly, under social pressure and with the ability to contribute, but ticipants were promised partaking in a lottery of 35 gift cards valued at having a less favorable view of crowdfunding, highly individualist USD 200 each. To ensure anonymity, respondents' e-mails were deleted people may resist social pressure and expectations, thereby reducing after the announcement of gift card winners. intentions to contribute. Moreover, one may be pressured to contribute Overall, our data collection effort resulted in 1710 responses, re- without having any intention to do so by higher authorities (e.g. em- presenting a response rate of 6.8%. However, after removing observa- ployers, spiritual leaders, and spouses). Hence, as long as the behavior tions with missing data and those suspected of monotonous response is not entirely within the volitional control of the individual, and to the patterns, we remained with complete data from 560 respondents (2.2% extent that it requires pre-consideration, various combinations of cog- response rate). For this purpose, a monotonous response pattern was nitive antecedents can have an impact on whether intentions are defined as recording the same response for ten consecutive items (in- translated into behavior. Hence, we hypothesize the following: cluding items from at least two separate multiple-item constructs). H7. The greater the individual's financial-contribution intentions, the Thirty-one respondents (5.5%) indicated that they had not contributed greater the likelihood of the individual's financial-contribution to a crowdfunding campaign before, while 529 respondents (94.5%) behavior. indicated they had made such contribution. Table 1 presents the sam- ple's descriptive statistics. H8. The greater the individual's crowdfunding information-sharing The sample size is sufficient for our analysis according to best intention, the greater the likelihood of the individual's financial- practice recommendations and meets some of the most stringent re- contribution behavior. quirements (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). Indeed, upon ex- Overall, the suggested model, represents an extended TPB approach amining sample size relative to frequency in a population (Sekaran & to reward crowdfunding as an intentional behavior. This extension in- Bougie, 2016), we achieved > 97% confidence that our sample is cludes two aspects. The first is the addition of information-sharing in- adequately representative of the population of the platform's users, tentions as an important component, separate from financial-contribu- tion intentions. The second is the addition of an association between the Table 1 two intentions expected to lead to crowdfunding contribution behavior. Sample descriptive statistics. The first addition to the TPB approach is based on the claim that Variable Categories Frequency Percentage since crowdfunding relates to the collection of relatively small sums from multiple individuals, the success of such a campaign depends on Gender Female – 1 284 50.71% Male - 2 276 49.29% enlisting the support of many individuals to contribute. This is achieved Education < 12 years 66 11.79% through information-sharing, which informs prospective contributors High school/ 107 19.11% about the opportunity while concurrently facilitating risk reduction and gymnasium trust enhancement. Accordingly, we suggest that the cognitive ante- Bachelor's degree 155 27.68% cedents of behavioral intentions impact both information-sharing (H1b- Master's degree 205 36.61% PhD degree 27 4.82% 5b) and financial-contribution intentions (H1a-5a) and that both in- Average daily time devoted to Zero 6 1.07% tentions affect behavior (H7 and H8). online browsing, search and Up to 1 h 183 32.68% Once we have established why we need to include information news 1 to 2 h 209 37.32% sharing in the model, we supplement an additional association, sug- 2 to 3 h 93 16.61% 3 to 4 h 46 8.21% gesting that one's own intention to financially contribute is expected to 5 h or more 23 4.11% influence one's intention to share information about that same cam- Average daily time devoted to Zero 52 9.29% paign with others (H6). As such, the logic shifts from the role of in- using social and professional Up to 1 h 230 41.07% formation sharing in crowdfunding regardless of own contribution in- networking sites 1 to 2 h 150 26.79% tentions, to its specific role, given that financial contribution intentions 2 to 3 h 81 14.46% 3 to 4 h 29 5.18% have been formed. Hence, the argument we use for this specific asso- 5 h or more 18 3.21% ciation suggests that once financial contribution intentions are formed, Total Financial contribution to Quartile 1: € 25% the individual has a vested interest in sharing the information with campaigns 0–30 others to enhance the likelihood of the campaign they intend to con- Quartile 2: € 25% 31–60 tribute to being successful. Quartile 3: € 25% 61–150 3. Methods Quartile 4: € 25% 151–12,000 Data were collected among users of Finland's largest reward 60 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 considering statistical power of 80%. For a known population, the Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004) as the marker variable and sample size at a given confidence level can be estimated using Cochran's found that the common variance explained further decreased to 35%. (1977) equation as follows: These findings suggest that there is no serious threat of common method bias in our data. z p (1 p) sample size (n) = 3.1. Measurement z p (1 p) 1 + ( ) e N All latent constructs in the model have been measured with multi- Here, z = two-tail z-score from the z-distribution table for a given item measures adopted from previous studies and conceptually adjusted confidence level (for example, 2.17 at 97% confidence level), p = hy- and re-specified into the crowdfunding context. Self-report measures pothesized percentage frequency of outcome factor in the population were used because they were deemed most suitable for capturing in- (typically, 50% ± 5), e = margin of error (typically 5% for confidence dividuals' perceptions. The measures used included the items presented level of 95%), and N = population size. in Table 3. Items were rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from The survey was first piloted among 12 participants including in- 1 (completely disagree with the statement) to 7 (completely agree with dividuals with and without prior crowdfunding contribution experi- the statement). Exploratory factor analysis led us to remove two items ence, and adjustments were made based on their feedback. The re- that did not load on one of the factors as expected (retained and re- sulting version was then translated from English to Finnish through a moved items are presented in Table 3). CFA verified that the emerging professional translation agency. This version of the translation was then factor structure reflected our conceptualization. Table 4 presents de- reviewed and modified by Finnish native-speaking employees of the scriptive statistics, the correlation matrix and reliability for all latent Mesenaatti platform to ensure proper interpretation and adequacy for constructs in our model. crowdfunding-specific jargon. All factor loadings were significant (p < 0.001) showing that in- Since mono-method studies may lend themselves to a certain level cluded items for each latent variable reflect a single underlying con- of method bias, we have followed Conway and Lance's (2010) re- struct. The reliabilities and variance extracted for each variable indicate commendations for overcoming these challenges by creating multiple the model's reliability and validity. All construct reliabilities exceeded versions of the survey by presenting the question items in random order or were close to 0.70 (R. Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). Variance extracted es- for each respondent, using multiple item constructs and examining their timates were all 0.5 and above. Hence, according to Fornell and Larcker validity via confirmatory factor analyses, as well as checking for con- (1981) discriminant validity was evident as the AVE within factors were vergent and discriminant validity. greater than the squared correlations between the latent variables, as To check for response bias, we compared two sub-samples of the presented in Table 5. first and last 280 respondents and found no significant differences of means with respect to gender, education level, time devoted to 3.2. Analysis browsing, time devoted to e-commerce, and time devoted to e-mail correspondence as evident in Table 2. A significant difference at the We checked for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Our data 0.05 level was identified with respect to age; however, since the mean were found to be non-normally distributed for all variables: financial age in the first group was 43, while the mean age in the latter group was contribution behavior, W = 0.985, p < 0.001; financial contribution 41, we consider this to be a statistically significant difference within a intention, W = 0.981, p < 0.001; information sharing intention, similar narrow age group, rather than reflecting significantly different W = 0.977, p < 0.001; attitudes, W = 0.955, p < 0.001; perceived age groups. behavior control, W = 0.682, p < 0.001; self-efficacy, W = 0.913, Furthermore, to check for common method bias (Podsakoff, p < 0.001; social norms, W = 0.981, p < 0.001; and subjective MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003), we followed the analytical tech- norms, W = 0.955, p < 0.001. Accordingly, as none of the variables niques examining Harman's single factor, common latent factor and a were normally distributed, the Satorra-Bentler rescaling method (also common marker variable, as well as their recommended threshold le- known as robust maximum likelihood) was employed for SEM estima- vels (Eichhorn, 2014). First, we performed exploratory factor analysis tion, as suggested by Rosseel (2012) (Fig. 1). considering only one latent factor and no rotation, using all the mea- Table 6 presents the estimation results when using two different surement items. This single factor explained about 32% of the variance, dependent variables capturing financial contribution behavior. Esti- which is below the recommended threshold of 50%. For further con- mation (a), corresponding to the model in Fig. 2(a), is based on a two- firmation, we added a ‘common’ latent factor in the original CFA model, item measure of financial contribution behavior rated on a 7-point which was uncorrelated with other latent variables and fixed equal Likert-type scale. Estimation (b), corresponding to the model in factor loading of all measurement items of the common factor. From the Fig. 2(b), is based on a single item measuring the log value of the total value equal factor loading (0.625), we observed that the common factor sum of contributions to reward campaigns in Euros. See Table 3 for explained about 43% of the variance, which is also below the re- specific item text formulations in the survey. commended level. Finally, we used the marker variable methods, using With complex SEMs, such as the one in this study, it is difficult to the multiple item scale of psychological entitlement (Campbell, achieve non-difference between the theoretical and observed models at the 5% significance level, and since the test is sensitive to large Ns, even Table 2 a good-fitting model may be rejected. Considering this, both SEMs in Response bias check. Fig. 2(a) and (b) have good model-fit based on the ratio of chi-square Mean first Mean last T df P value and degrees of freedom (for 2a. [1186.09/568 = 2.09 < 3] and for 2b. responders responders [1107.67/535 = 2.07 < 3]), as recommended by Bollen and Long (1992). All other goodness-of-fit measures meet the requirements: the Age 43.546 41.375 2.074 557.40 0.039 Comparative Fit Index (CFI) at 0.95 is above the 0.90 recommended Gender 1.529 1.518 0.253 558.00 0.800 Education level 3.014 2.939 0.790 557.55 0.430 minimum threshold (Bentler, 1990); The Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) at Web browsing time 3.096 3.121 −0.268 557.93 0.789 0.94 in model (a) and 0.95 in model (b) is above the 0.90 recommended E-commerce time 1.807 1.811 −0.058 553.22 0.953 minimum threshold (Bentler & Bonett, 1980); The Root Mean Square E-mail time 2.607 2.732 −1.352 557.87 0.177 Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.04 is well below the re- commended maximum threshold of 0.08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999); and the 1. Null hypothesis: The mean is the same for both first and last respondents' samples. Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR) at 0.06 is below the 61 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 Table 3 Survey items, measurement properties and sources. Latent construct Measurement items* Factor loadings Source ATT (attitude) ATT1 I think I would like contributing to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.841*** ATT 1-2 adapted and modified from “attitude” (towards blog usage) in Hsu ATT2 I am likely to feel good about contributing to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.822*** and Lin (2008) ATT3 I think contributing to crowdfunding campaigns is good for me. 0.818*** ATT3-6 adapted and modified from “attitude” (towards online shopping) in ATT4 I think contributing to crowdfunding campaigns is appropriate for me. 0.851*** Hsu et al. (2006) ATT5 I think contributing to crowdfunding campaigns is beneficial for me. 0.765*** ATT6 I have a positive opinion about contributing to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.811*** PBC (perceived behavior control) PBC1 My engagement in contributing to crowdfunding campaigns is within my control. Removed PBC 1-3 adapted and modified from “perceived behavioral control” (towards PBC2 I would be able to contribute to crowdfunding campaigns (if I wanted to). 0.842*** participation in online travel community) in Casaló et al. (2010) PBC3 The decision to contribute to crowdfunding campaigns is entirely mine. 0.846*** PBC 4-5 adapted and modified from “perceived behavioral control” (towards PBC4 Whether or not I contribute to crowdfunding campaigns is entirely up to me. 0.765*** online shopping) in Hsu et al. (2006) PBC5 I very much feel that whether I contribute or don't contribute to crowdfunding campaigns is Removed beyond my control. SELE (self-efficacy) SELE1 I have confidence in my ability to support crowdfunding campaigns. 0.786*** SELE 1-2 adapted and modified from “knowledge self-efficacy” (towards SELE2 I have the expertise needed to contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.700*** eWoM) in Cheung and Lee (2012) SELE3 I am confident in my ability to navigate and use crowdfunding platforms' websites. 0.820*** SELE 3-4 adapted and modified from items under “Internet self-efficacy” in SELE4 I am confident in my ability to contribute to campaigns through crowdfunding platforms' 0.857*** Hsu and Chiu (2004) websites. SOCN (social norms) SOCN1 I read/saw news which suggested that contributing to crowdfunding campaigns is a good way 0.711*** SOCN adapted and modified from “social norms” (towards s-services) in Hsu of supporting interesting projects. and Chiu (2004) SOCN2 The popular press (media) depicted a positive sentiment towards contributions to 0.836*** crowdfunding campaigns. SOCN3 Mass media reports convinced me to contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.855*** SOCN4 Expert opinions depicted positive opinions about contributions to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.749*** SUBN (subjective norms) SUBN1 People who are important to me think that I should contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.849*** SUBN 1-2 adapted and modified from “social norms” (towards blog usage) in SUBN2 People who influence my behavior encourage me to contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.786*** Hsu and Lin (2008) SUBN3 My colleagues think that I should contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.786*** SUBN 3-4 adapted and modified from “interpersonal influence” (towards SUBN4 My friends think that I should contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.883*** online shopping) in Hsu et al. (2006) FCI (financial contribution FCI1 Given the chance, I intend to financially contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.851*** FCI 1-3 adapted and modified from “intention to transact” in Pavlou (2003) intention) FCI2 Given the chance, I predict that I would financially contribute to crowdfunding campaigns in 0.860*** FCI 4-5 adapted and modified from “intention to participate” in Algesheimer the future. et al. (2005) FCI3 It is likely that I will financially contribute to crowdfunding campaigns in the near future. 0.851*** FCI4 I have the intention to financially contribute to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.900*** FCI5 I intend to actively contribute to crowdfunding campaigns financially. 0.701*** ISI (information sharing intention) ISI1 I intend to share information about crowdfunding campaigns I know of more frequently in 0.875*** ISI 1-6 adapted and modified from “eWoM intention” in Cheung and Lee the future. (2012) ISI2 I intend to share information about crowdfunding campaigns I supported more frequently in 0.868*** the future. ISI3 I will always provide information about crowdfunding campaigns I know of at the request of 0.674*** others. ISI4 I will always provide information about crowdfunding campaigns I supported at the request 0.657*** of others. ISI5 I will try to share information about crowdfunding campaigns I know of in a more effective 0.898*** way. ISI6 I will try to share information about crowdfunding campaigns I supported in a more effective 0.910*** way. FINC (financial contribution FINC1 I frequently contribute financially to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.761*** FINC 1-2 adapted and modified from “eWoM Participation” in Yoo, Sanders, behaviour) FINC2 I spend much effort in financially contributing to crowdfunding campaigns. 0.634*** and Moon (2013) Amount Roughly estimating please indicate how much money IN TOTAL have you contributed to Own single item alternative measure for FINC reward-based crowdfunding campaigns in the past year? (please indicate currency and sum). 1. Number of observation is 560 for all measurement items. 2. Model fit: χ2 (499) = 1457.71, CFI = 0.92, TLI = 0.91, RMSEA = 0.06, SRMR = 0.06. 3. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 Table 4 Descriptive statistics and reliability (Cronbach alpha). Variables Mean Median SD ATT PBC SELE SOCN SUBN FCI ISI FINC Reliability ATT 4.975 5.00 1.304 1.000 0.92 PBC 6.419 7.00 1.011 0.242 1.000 0.86 SELE 5.538 5.75 1.227 0.471 0.487 1.000 0.87 SOCN 4.177 4.50 1.404 0.458 0.160 0.253 1.000 0.86 SUBN 2.925 3.00 1.382 0.448 −0.094 0.146 0.344 1.000 0.89 FCI 4.238 4.40 1.403 0.668 0.122 0.384 0.328 0.366 1.000 0.92 ISI 3.432 3.42 1.420 0.548 0.027 0.245 0.341 0.423 0.597 1.000 0.92 FINC 2.525 2.50 1.115 0.407 −0.033 0.256 0.212 0.391 0.661 0.582 1.000 0.65 Amount 186.59 60.00 669.26 0.129 0.004 0.166 −0.017 0.099 0.274 0.180 0.489 1. Mean and SD are based on arithmetic average of all items measuring each latent variable. 2. Correlation matrix is based on the correlation among the latent variables constructed through confirmatory factor analysis. 3. Reliability represents the value of Cronbach Alpha. 4. Amount Mean and SD are in Euros. Table 5 Both model estimations show support for hypotheses H1(a) and Discriminant validity. H1(b), suggesting that favorable attitudes are positively associated with financial-contribution and information-sharing intentions. We also ATT PBC SELE SOCN SUBN FCI ISI FINC found support for H2(a), suggesting that self-efficacy is positively as- ATT 1.000 sociated with financial-contribution intention, but not with informa- PBC 0.059 1.000 tion-sharing intentions rejecting H2(b). Hypotheses H3(a) and H3(b) SELE 0.222 0.237 1.000 were rejected, as we found significant negative association between SOCN 0.210 0.026 0.064 1.000 PBC and financial-contribution intention and no association between SUBN 0.201 0.009 0.021 0.118 1.000 FCI 0.446 0.015 0.147 0.108 0.134 1.000 PBC and information-sharing intentions. Hypotheses H4(a) and H4(b) ISI 0.300 0.001 0.060 0.116 0.179 0.356 1.000 were supported, suggesting subjective norms are positively associated FINC 0.166 0.001 0.066 0.045 0.153 0.437 0.339 1.000 with financial-contribution and information-intentions. However, Hy- AVE 0.670 0.670 0.629 0.624 0.684 0.698 0.673 0.491 potheses H5(a) and H5(b) were both rejected, suggesting no association between social norms and financial-contribution and information- Squared Pearson correlations below diagonal are lower than Average Variance sharing intentions. H6 was supported, suggesting that financial-con- Extracted (AVE) of each latent variable; therefore, divergent validity is con- firmed. tribution intentions are positively associated with information-sharing intentions. Finally, while H7 posited a positive association between fi- maximum threshold of 0.08 (Ibid.). Hence, acceptable support for the nancial-contribution intentions and behavior, regardless of how fi- model is provided. nancial-contribution behavior is measured, H8 was only supported As for explanatory power, the R-square of the latent outcome vari- when behavior was measured on two self-reported items, but not when ables in the main SEM model explains 46.5% of the variance of fi- behavior was measured by the actual amount contributed. This latter nancial-contribution intentions, 41.8% of the variance of information- finding suggests that information-sharing affects financial contribution sharing intentions, and 49.2% of the variance of financial-contribution behavior, but not the sum contributed. behavior. Fig. 1. Research model. 63 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 Table 6 Estimation results. Hypothesis Relationship Std. estimate (a) Std. estimate (b) Results H1a ATT → FCI 0.580*** 0.585*** Confirmed. (0.051) (0.051) H2a PBC → FCI −0.085* −0.084* Rejected. Negative effect instead of positive. (0.052) (0.052) H3a SELE → FCI 0.135** 0.135** Confirmed. (0.054) (0.054) H5a SOCN→ FCI 0.010 0.009 Rejected. (0.042) (0.042) H4a SUBN → FCI 0.090* 0.085* Confirmed. (0.043) (0.043) H1b ATT → ISI 0.175** 0.176** Confirmed. (0.054) (0.055) H2b PBC → ISI −0.065† −0.064† Rejected. Weak negative effect instead of positive. (0.052) (0.052) H3b SELE → ISI −0.012 −0.013 Rejected. (0.051) (0.051) H5b SOCN → ISI 0.082† 0.083† Weakly confirmed. (0.045) (0.046) H4b SUBN → ISI 0.167*** 0.167*** Confirmed. (0.039) (0.040) H6 FCI → ISI 0.395*** 0.395*** Confirmed. (0.051) (0.052) H7 FCI → FINC 0.464*** 0.274*** Confirmed (0.042) (0.050) H8 ISI → FINC 0.311*** 0.026 Confirmed (0.045) (0.053) Control variables Gender → FINC −0.098** −0.170*** Females report higher financial contribution behavior. (0.076) (0.107) Age → FINC 0.028 0.184*** Age not affecting financial contribution behavior. (0.003) (0.004) 1. Particulars of (a) are for the SEM model where FINC is measured by two observed items and (b) for the model where FINC is measured by contribution amount. 2. Model fit (a): χ2 (568) = 1188.09, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.06. 3. Model fit (b): χ2 (535) = 1107.67, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.06. 4. Standard error in parenthesis. 5. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 3.3. Comparison of high and low contributor group group exhibited significantly higher levels of attitudes (p- value = 0.007), self-efficacy (p-value = 0.035), financial contribution Triggered by the above findings, we conducted a post-hoc analysis intention (p-value < 0.001) and information-sharing intention (p- aiming to explore whether high and low financial-contributor groups value < 0.001) than did the low-sum contributor group. differ in their levels of attitude, perceived behavior control, self-effi- When viewing these additional findings in relation to the current cacy, social norms, subjective norms, financial contribution intention study's main hypotheses' findings, one may suggest that experience in and information-sharing intention, we conducted a multi-group CFA. crowdfunding contribution provides a possible explanation for some of Multi-group analysis allows us to compare means or regression coeffi- the common variance captured in the noted significant associations. cients across groups, in the present case, high and low financial-con- Here, contribution amount can be considered a proxy for repeated tributor groups. We defined the two groups by the median value of the contributions, where higher sums are associated with more instances of financial contribution amount (Euro 60). Thus, the low-sum contributor contribution. In turn, repeated contributions may indicative of high group consists of all respondents contributing amounts below 60 Euros levels of crowdfunding-contribution experience. When viewed through (273 observations) and the high-sum contributor group was re- this prism, one may argue that not only do self-efficacy and attitudes spondents with contributions at or above 60 Euros (287 observations). directly affect intention to financially contribute, but they may also As we sought to compare the means of latent constructs among serve as mediators between crowdfunding contribution experience and high-sum and low-sum contributors, we need to first confirm scalar intentions to contribute. Similarly, attitudes may not only directly affect invariance (Byrne, Shavelson, & Muthén, 1989; Chen, 2008; the intention to share information but also serve as a mediator between Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). This is achieved by constraining factor crowdfunding-contribution experience and information-sharing inten- loadings and intercepts equal across groups and then comparing the tions. However, whereas experience does enhance both self-efficacy model with a metric invariance model where only factor loadings are and information-sharing intentions separately, these effects do not constrained to be equal across groups. Initially, we failed to achieve translate into a significant association between self-efficacy and in- scalar invariance, as there was a significant difference (p-value < formation-sharing intentions. 0.001) between the equal factor loading and the equal intercept model. However, partial scalar invariance (Byrne et al., 1989) was achieved 4. Discussion after withdrawing the equality constraint of the intercepts of the vari- able FC5 across groups. Table 7 presents the measurement invariance Overall, our findings suggest that our model properly captures the analysis. The chi-square difference test indicated no difference antecedents of financial contribution behavior in the context of reward (p = 0.069) between the equal loadings and equal intercepts mea- crowdfunding and provides support for both the conceptual application surement models at the 5% significance level. Thus, we can compare of the TPB in this context, as well as the importance of the two inten- means of latent constructs of the scalar invariance model across groups. tional components – financial-contribution and information-sharing The results of this comparison suggest that the high-sum contributor intentions in predicting crowdfunding behavior. By doing so, it offers 64 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 (caption on next page) 65 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 Fig. 2. (a). SEM model with FINC measured by two items. 1. Model fit: χ2 (568) = 1186.086, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.06. 2. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. (b). SEM model with FINC measured by contribution amount. 1. Model fit: χ2 (535) = 1107.670, CFI = 0.95, TLI = 0.95, RMSEA = 0.04, SRMR = 0.06. 2. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. the TPB's antecedents functioned as predicted by the theory with sig- Table 7 Measurement invariance test. nificant positive effects of attitude and subjective norms and a weak effect of social norms on these intentions, no effects of self-efficacy and Multi-group Df Chisq ΔChisq ΔDf p-Value ΔCFI ∆RMSEA a weak negative effect of PBC we revealed. Here, the weak effect of PBC CFA models (> Chisq) may be explained by reasoning similar to that posed above, suggesting Configural 998 2326.3 NA NA that increasing levels of social pressure may trigger resistance among Equal loadings 1024 2368.4 34.583 26 0.121 0.001 0.001 users who place value in their control over participation in crowd- Equal intercepts 1049 2405.1 36.156 25 0.069 0.001 0 funding, and hence, may make them more reluctant to share informa- tion in addition to reducing intentions to contribute financially. However, the lack of an effect of self-efficacy on information-sharing new insights into the role played by cognitive antecedents of crowd- intentions may result from a situation in which those feeling both funding contribution behavior, which haven't been examined thus far. highly and minimally competent with making online financial trans- First, our findings show that all TPB (Ajzen, 1991) antecedents actions, may still feel equally competent when it comes to sharing in- functioned as predicted by the theory, with significant positive effects formation online about the campaigns. As sharing information may be of attitudes, self-efficacy, and subjective norms on financial contribu- considered less risky and less technically demanding than online tion behavior. However, social norms, defined as those captured by transactions, our sample of crowdfunding platform users may be media and expert opinions, do not affect financial-contribution inten- characterized by only little variability in terms of their perceived tion, and only weakly affect crowdfunding information-sharing inten- competence in sharing information online. Moreover, the variability tions. A potential explanation for this finding may be that views of that does exist maybe derived primarily from the capacity to contribute crowdfunding by experts and media may include extreme opinions that financially to a campaign rather than to share information concerning capture both sceptics concerned about associated risks and consumer it. protection, as well as optimists expressing favorable views about the Third, our findings also suggest that financial-contribution intention role of crowdfunding in the democratization of finance and consumer has a positive effect on information-sharing intentions. This finding empowerment. Exposure to such opposing opinions may operate in may provide support for the applicability of the assumptions related to both directions so that their effects cancel each other out, producing an self-presentation theory (Schlenker & Leary, 1982) in the context of overall non-significant effect. crowdfunding-contribution behavior. Thus, information sharing may Furthermore, and surprisingly, we found PBC to affect contribution present the individual with an opportunity to socially signal his or her behavior negatively rather than positively. This may be explained by engagement as a contributor, perceiving it as an activity viewed fa- separating the control and self-efficacy dimensions in our model. vorably by others. This finding is consistent with earlier research Whereas self-efficacy captures the ability to contribute to reward- showing increased contribution behavior with backer visibility (Cox crowdfunding campaigns in general, PBC captures the ability to control et al., 2018), and motivations for own image enhancement engagement in crowdfunding under conditions of exposure to crowd- (Bretschneider & Leimeister, 2017). Alternatively, the finding may also funding campaigning. Placed in this context, PBC may reflect the ability be explained by assuming that once committed financially to a project, to control contribution behavior under the condition of social pressure contributors have a vested interest in seeing it completed successfully to to contribute, which may characterize crowdfunding dynamics of social receive the rewards they purchased. Thus, to enhance the likelihood of spread via social media and networking sites. Indeed, earlier research the campaign's successful completion, contributors are likely to be more has shown that social and peer pressures have an impact on charitable engaged in sharing information about this campaign to their respective giving (Frey & Meier, 2004; Meer, 2011), as well as purchase intentions network of contacts. These notions find support in earlier studies sug- (Gunawan & Huarng, 2015). Accordingly, PBC's negative effect on in- gesting that number of social-media shares of campaign information tentions may reflect an ability to resist social pressure in crowdfunding positively impact the likelihood of campaign success (Berliner & campaign dynamics. Thus, the more an individual can resist social Kenworthy, 2017; Hobbs et al., 2016). pressure in crowdfunding campaigns, the less likely he or she is to In this context, and despite the presented arguments, one may also develop contribution intentions. envisage a reverse causality, where information-sharing intentions po- While social media campaigning intensity and pressure have not sitively affect financial-contribution intentions. Such claims may build been thoroughly studied in crowdfunding research, earlier studies have on the reasoning that sharing information about a crowdfunding cam- acknowledged the importance of social media campaigning and en- paign may represent a lower threshold of effort and costs than would a gagements in influencing campaign success in reward (Borst, Moser, & financial contribution to such a campaign. Thus, once information is Ferguson, 2017; Hobbs et al., 2016), donation (Berliner & Kenworthy, shared, one can consider reactions of others to that information in their 2017), and equity crowdfunding (Lukkarinen, Teich, Wallenius, & decision whether to contribute financially to the campaign. This line of Wallenius, 2016), as well as viewing it as an integral part of the general reasoning has received some support from game theory, where ‘cheap crowdfunding process (Lawton & Marom, 2012; Mollick, 2014; Shneor talk’ can sometimes affect real pay-off actions (Farrell, 1995). One way & Flåten, 2015). Furthermore, Cho and Kim (2017) suggested that this to settle these contradictory predictions is through a qualitative in- may be influenced by culture, showing that higher number of campaign vestigation of funders' own views on the issue. While this remains comments were positively associated with campaign success in the outside the scope of the current study, it does present an interesting United States, but were associated negatively with success in the opportunity for future studies. Korean context due to the uncertainty that this ‘noise’ generated in a Fourth, we have shown that both financial-contribution and in- relatively uncertainty-avoiding culture such as Korea. formation-sharing intentions affect financial-contribution behavior. Second, upon examining the antecedents of crowdfunding in- This supports earlier notions expressed in the literature that both formation-sharing intentions, our findings show that whereas most of 66 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 aspects are fundamental to crowdfunding practice (Lawton & Marom, have been enhanced by linking and comparing self-reported data with 2012; Mollick, 2014; Shneor & Flåten, 2015), with the current study platform data. However, our lack of access to the platform's own da- presenting some of its first empirical evidence. tabase and the assurance of anonymity for our participants, made such Finally, an insight indirectly emerging from the current post-hoc linkages impossible. Nevertheless, we addressed method-bias chal- comparisons between low- and high-sum contributors, one may suggest lenges by following recommendations by Conway and Lance (2010) in that the crowdfunding-contribution experience could explain some of creating multiple versions of the survey through the random-order the common variance captured in significant associations identified in presentation of questionnaire items for each respondent, using multiple the present study. From a theoretical perspective, earlier work is in- item constructs and examining their validity via CFA and checking for consistent with respect to the role of experience in the context of TPB. convergent and discriminant validity. Furthermore, as noted, our ex- Some consider this part of the PBC (Ajzen & Madden, 1986), while aminations of both response bias and common method bias indicated others claim that its total effect cannot be fully explained by its in- that such problems were not evident in our data. tegration into PBC (R. P. Bagozzi & Kimmel, 1995). Regardless, one could argue that previous positive experience in crowdfunding con- 5. Conclusions tribution may further enhance individuals' favorable attitudes, as well as self-efficacy towards future crowdfunding contributions. In such Reward crowdfunding is an important channel through which en- cases, self-efficacy and attitudes do not only directly affect intention to trepreneurs can raise funding for their ventures. It implies non-mone- financially contribute but may also serve as mediators between the tary benefits in return for money contributed to projects by backers, crowdfunding-contribution experience and intentions to contribute. while incorporating the relatively high-risk of non-delivery on pitch Hence, future studies may incorporate either longitudinal data or promises that are typical in entrepreneurial ventures. Our analyses measures of previous crowdfunding contribution experience for prop- contribute to the budding literature on motivational factors in crowd- erly capturing such effects. funding contribution behavior in general, and by addressing the un- derstudied role played by important cognitive antecedents of such be- 4.1. Limitations havior in particular. We demonstrated the applicability of the planned behavior approach to understanding crowdfunding contribution beha- While this study presents interesting findings and insights, it also vior while answering earlier calls for further research on the perspec- has some shortcomings that should be acknowledged. First, whereas tives of crowdfunding backers and psychology in general (McKenny our findings may be somewhat constrained in terms of their general- et al., 2017), and in the Nordic context in particular (Shneor, Jenssen, & izability beyond the national and platform context in which the data Vissak, 2016). were collected, they are based on a relatively large sample in com- We do so by applying an extended version of the TPB framework parison with some earlier published studies. Moreover, the findings into the reward crowdfunding context while highlighting the ante- provide valuable insights into users of national platforms from small cedents of reward crowdfunding intentions as well as the dual impact of open economies (relative to most previous studies who derived their both financial-contribution and information-sharing intentions of analyses from data scraped from global platforms such as Kickstarter). crowdfunding financial contribution behavior. This was accomplished Nevertheless, a wider-scale, cross-country and cross-platform study by our analysis of survey data collected from users of a national reward may strengthen generalizability of the findings and illuminate the po- crowdfunding platform, operating in one of Europe's most crowd- tential roles of contextual factors in shaping the phenomena under in- funding friendly countries - Finland. vestigation. Indeed, earlier studies have shown evidence for differences Our findings provide support for both the conceptual application of between countries in terms of crowdfunding volumes (Ziegler et al., the TPB in the reward crowdfunding context and the recognition of the 2018), new crowdfunding platform creation levels (Dushnitsky, importance of the two intentional components – financial-contribution Guerini, Piva, & Rossi-Lamastra, 2016), relevant regulatory frameworks and information-sharing intentions in predicting crowdfunding beha- (Gajda, 2017), and campaign success drivers (Cho & Kim, 2017). vior. We showed that attitude, self-efficacy, and subjective norms po- Similarly, the generalizability of the present findings is also con- sitively affect financial-contribution intentions, whereas social norms strained to the context of reward crowdfunding. It remains to be seen do not. Surprisingly, we found that PBC affects intentions negatively, whether similar dynamics and effects are also evident in investment and suggest that this may reflect resistance to excessive social pressure models of crowdfunding. This would be of particular interest, given that from campaigners among those who value their control over their information sharing in investment crowdfunding may be more heavily contribution behavior. Moreover, we showed that favorable attitudes regulated, incentive schemes may be more sophisticated, and financial and subjective norms affect information-sharing behavior. Financial- literacy and competence play a greater role in decision making contribution intentions positively were shown to positively affect in- (Heminway, 2014; Niemand, Angerer, Thies, Kraus, & Hebenstreit, formation-sharing intentions. And both these intentions, in turn, posi- 2018). tively affect contribution behavior. This finding stresses the dual nature Our analyses follow a conceptual path dependency, where our focus of reward crowdfunding intentions, including both financial-contribu- on the TPB framework affected our problem formulation and research tion and information-sharing, which is often overlooked in the litera- design. We built on the extensive use of the TPB in understanding user ture, given that most previous studies have focused on financial con- behavior in multiple Internet mediated marketplaces. However, we also tribution. examined extensions to the original TPB formulation by incorporating Furthermore, we have also shown that upon comparing high- and social norms in addition to subjective norms, self-efficacy in addition to low-sum contributors, the former group exhibited significantly higher PBC, and using intentionality towards two distinct aspects (e.g., fi- levels of attitudes, self-efficacy, financial-contribution intention and nancial contribution and information sharing) in influencing reward- information-sharing intention than did the latter. This Suggests that crowdfunding contribution behavior. Nevertheless, there is room for efforts to enhance attitudes and self-efficacy may result not only in employing alternative theoretical anchors and frameworks for ana- increased intentions to financially contribute, but also in actual con- lyzing crowdfunding-contributor behavior and its antecedents, such as, tributions of larger sums. the technology acceptance model (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000), social In summary, our study offers several contributions. First, it fills a capital theory (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998) and social cognitive theory gap of studying crowdfunding behavior from a cognitive perspective, (Bandura, 1986). and the first to empirically validate the applicability of the TPB fra- Finally, our study is a mono-method study which may lend itself to a mework along with highlighted theoretical extensions in reward certain level of method bias. Specifically, our data's reliability could crowdfunding behavior. Specifically, this study provides evidence for 67 R. Shneor and Z.H. Munim Journal of Business Research 103 (2019) 56–70 the dual nature of reward crowdfunding as depending on both fi- and indirectly, behavior. nancial-contribution and information-sharing intentions. As such, this Furthermore, platforms may also consider a recognition scheme for theoretical extension represents a useful framework that may be ap- supporters, enhancing their self-efficacy and attitudes by awarding plied and tested in other contexts. These may include non-investment them public recognition badges or status as “professional funders” and crowdfunding models such as donation crowdfunding, where in- “expert funders” based on participation in training, number of cam- dividuals both contribute financially and promote a cause by sharing paigns supported, as well as their social media reach in information information about it. Similarly, it may also apply to other e-commerce sharing about campaigns. transactions, where individuals engage in both purchase and informa- Finally, an additional emerging-insight is that entrepreneurs tion sharing about purchases; these transactions may include cases of creating reward crowdfunding campaigns should manage a delicate products with hedonic value (e.g. vacations), social signaling (e.g. fes- balance in their promotional strategies in reaching out to contributors, tival participation), or status signaling (e.g. purchasing luxury goods). but at the same time, avoid creating excessive social pressures that may Furthermore, the research contributes to a more pluralistic study of trigger resistance among those who value control over their own con- reward crowdfunding beyond global platforms such as Kickstarter and tribution behavior. provides insights based on a national platform in a crowdfunding- friendly European country, such as Finland. In this context, it is also one Acknowledgements of only few studies deriving its primary data directly from users, rather than data scraped off platform websites. Finally, our findings are based The authors would like to thank the support of the management of on the analysis of a relatively large dataset comprising of quality data Mesenaatti.me, including – Pauliina Seppälä, Tanja Jänicke and Marko that have withstood the required qualifications and a variety of bias Tanninen in survey translation, reviews and its distribution to users. tests. Funding 5.1. Implications for research This work has been supported by Nordic Innovation [grant number In terms of research implications, our findings present evidence for ENT13508]. the applicability of our TPB-based model in explaining reward crowd- funding intentions and behavior. 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Reward crowdfunding contribution as planned behaviour: An extended framework

Shneor, Rotem; Munim, Ziaul Haque

Journal of Business Research – Oct 1, 2019

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DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.06.013
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Reward crowdfunding contribution as planned behaviour: An extended framework

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Reward crowdfunding contribution as planned behaviour: An extended framework

Reward crowdfunding contribution as planned behaviour: An extended framework

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