Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
(1977)
Coder's manual for identifying serious inter-nation disputes
D. Singer (1958)
Threat-perception and the armament-tension dilemmaJournal of Conflict Resolution, 2
(1969)
hllTCHELL (1969)"Computer simulation of international
Michael Wallace, Judy Wilson (1978)
Non-linear Arms Race ModelsJournal of Peace Research, 15
(1965)
Kussett (ed.) Peace, War, and h'umbers
(1970)
1970)”hlathematical models ofarmsraces,”in B. hl. Russett, What Price Vigilance? New Ilaven, C T Yale
Michael Wallace (1973)
War and rank among nations
John Gillespie, Dina Zinnes, G. Tahim, Philip Schrodt, R. Rubison (1977)
An Optimal Control Model of Arms RacesAmerican Political Science Review, 71
(1972)
Capabilitydistribution, uncertainty.and major power war, 1820-1965
L. Richardson, N. Rashevsky, E. Trucco (1960)
Arms and insecurity
Michael Wallace (1976)
Arms races and the balance of power: a mathematical modelApplied Mathematical Modelling, 1
Partha Chatterjee (1975)
Arms, Alliances and Stability
(1958)
Arms races: prerequisites and results,
Joseph Jerome, Arthur Sard, Sol Weintraub (1971)
A book of splines
(1969)
Computer simulation of international processes: the Vietnam War and the pre-World War 1 naval race
A. Rapoport (1957)
Lewis F. Richardson's mathematical theory of warJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1
(1978)
Exploring Competitive Arms Processes
J. Singer, Melvin Small (1966)
The Composition and Status Ordering of the International System: 1815–1940World Politics, 18
(1975)
Nations in Conflict: Population, Expansion, and War
(1975)
Dimensions historiques d e modelesdynamiques de conflict
(1976)
Contemporary Research in International Relations
Although major power arms races have been the subject of a great amount of mathematical modelling, there has been little data-based research concerning their impact on international war. This study attempts to determine whether or not these arms races affect the probability that a serious dispute between major powers will escalate to all-out war. To do this, an arms race index is constructed in the following manner: a curve-fitting technique is employed to calculate changes in arms expenditures for each major power as a function of time. The smoothed rates of increase for each of the parties to a dispute are multiplied together, yielding an index whose values will be high only if the two powers have engaged in rapid and simultaneous military expansion prior to the dispute. It was found that disputes preceded by such an arms race escalated to war 23 out of 28 times, while disputes not preceded by an arms race resulted in war only 3 out of 71 times. It was concluded that at the very least, arms races are an important early warning indicator of escalation potential, and may well play a central role in the escalation process. The implications of this finding for the current debate over SALT II were noted.
Journal of Conflict Resolution – SAGE
Published: Mar 1, 1979
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.