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This article posits that the effect of political hazards on the choice of market entry mode varies across multinational firms based on the extent to which they face expropriation hazards from their potential joint-venture partners in the host country (the level of contractual hazards). As political hazards increase, the multinational faces an increasing threat of opportunistic expropriation by the government. Partnering with host-country firms that possess a comparative advantage in interactions with the host-country government can safeguard against this hazard. However, as contractual hazards increase, the potential benefit to the joint-venture partner of manipulating the political system for it's own benefit at the expense of the multinational increases as well, thereby diminishing the hazard-mitigating benefit of forming a joint venture. A two-stage bivariate probit estimation technique is used to test these hypotheses on a sample of 3,389 overseas manufacturing operations by 461 firms in 112 countries. Oxford University Press « Previous | Next Article » Table of Contents This Article JLEO (2000) 16 (2): 334-364. doi: 10.1093/jleo/16.2.334 » Abstract Free Full Text (PDF) Free Classifications Article Services Article metrics Alert me when cited Alert me if corrected Find similar articles Similar articles in Web of Science Add to my archive Download citation Request Permissions Citing Articles Load citing article information Citing articles via CrossRef Citing articles via Scopus Citing articles via Web of Science Citing articles via Google Scholar Google Scholar Articles by Henisz, W. Search for related content Related Content Load related web page information Share Email this article CiteULike Delicious Facebook Google+ Mendeley Twitter What's this? 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The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization – Oxford University Press
Published: Oct 1, 2000
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