Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 7-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Non-Existence of Single-Wage Equilibria in Search Models with Adverse Selection

Non-Existence of Single-Wage Equilibria in Search Models with Adverse Selection Abstract This paper examines the problem of non-existence of a single-wage equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a non-concavity in the payoff function. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1992 The Review of Economic Studies Limited http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Review of Economic Studies Oxford University Press

Non-Existence of Single-Wage Equilibria in Search Models with Adverse Selection

Download PDF
8 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/oxford-university-press/non-existence-of-single-wage-equilibria-in-search-models-with-adverse-DTW9eoYdCS

References (7)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 1992 The Review of Economic Studies Limited
ISSN
0034-6527
eISSN
1467-937X
DOI
10.2307/2297867
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines the problem of non-existence of a single-wage equilibrium in a simple search model with asymmetric information. A pure-strategy, symmetric Nash equilibrium fails to exist because adverse selection arising from steady-state considerations causes a non-concavity in the payoff function. This content is only available as a PDF. © 1992 The Review of Economic Studies Limited

Journal

The Review of Economic Studies – Oxford University Press

Published: Jul 1, 1992

There are no references for this article.