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Christine Korsgaard (1996)
Creating the Kingdom of Ends: An introduction to the ethical, political, and religious thought of Kant
(2021)
Translated into Catalan for Filosofia, Ara! Revista per a pensar
Christine Korsgaard (1992)
Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal RelationsPhilosophical Perspectives, 6
(2022)
Commentary on Barbara Herman's The Moral Habitat. Author Meets Critics session at the Pacific APA in Vancouver
Christine Korsgaard (1986)
Skepticism about Practical ReasonThe Journal of Philosophy, 83
Christine Korsgaard (2018)
Fellow Creatures. Our Obligations to the Other AnimalsZeitschrift für philosophische Forschung
Christine Korsgaard (1986)
Aristotle and Kant on the Source of ValueEthics, 96
(2014)
Treating People as Ends in Themselves" Interview by Richard Marshall for 3 am Magazine
Christine Korsgaard (1986)
Kant's Formula of Humanity, 77
(2012)
An interview by Julian Baggini for The Philosopher's Magazine
(2012)
The Wooster Journal of Philosophical Inquiry, a student philosophy journal at the College of Wooster
Being Good and Being Good-For Someone" For the British Academy, via Zoom
(2003)
Sovremennie Tetradi, 2005, SS
(2000)
Internalism and the Sources of Normativity" A transcribed oral interview with Herlinde Pauer-Studer. Translated into German, in Herlinde Pauer-Studer, Konstruktionen praktischer Vernunft
Christine Korsgaard (1993)
The Reasons we can Share: An Attack on the Distinction between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral ValuesSocial Philosophy and Policy, 10
Practical Implications of Kant's Categorical Imperative" at the meetings of the North American Kant Society at the Eastern Division APA
Christine Korsgaard (1986)
The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with EvilPhilosophy & Public Affairs
Provisional Rights and the State
J. Watson, Robert Arp (2011)
Critical Thinking: An Introduction to Reasoning Well
Christine Korsgaard (1989)
Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to ParfitPhilosophy & Public Affairs
Downloaded from http://read.dukeupress.edu/the-philosophical-review/article-pdf/130/2/315/930121/315jamieson.pdf by DEEPDYVE INC user on 30 March 2022 BOOK REVIEWS capacities, and ends that seem more naturally suited to the good practical use of those capacities. This tension is brought out strikingly in the book’s final para- graph: The guiding thread of this book is that Kant conceives of reflection in resolutely cognitivist terms. It is in the interest of knowing, and that alone, that we ought to be reflective. The motto of the Kantian reflective ideal is self-determination through understanding. There is an element of submission to this, of owing fidelity to what obtains independently of any particular exercise of cognitive capacities. This includes fidelity to a value that obtains independently of anything anyone does or doesn’t do, cares about or doesn’t care about. This submission, moreover, is not to any indifferent fact about what is the case. We owe fidelity, chiefly, to what is most worth caring about in the complete order of things. For Kant, this can only be actual human beings. (208) In Merritt’s final accounting, the value of knowing appears derivative; the value of actual human beings, fundamental. One wonders whether this ordering of values is fully compatible with the primacy
The Philosophical Review – Duke University Press
Published: Apr 1, 2021
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