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Multicultural Education: what kind of relativism is possible?

Multicultural Education: what kind of relativism is possible? Multicultural Education: what kind of relativism is possible? No discussion of multicultural education at a philosophical level should seek to mask the wretched experience, for many of our newer settlers and their children, of social and economic inequality rendered more damaging by racial prejudice and discrimination. But Karl Marx may only have been partly right when he denied that philosophy could change the world. A philosopher is, let us suppose, confronted with a prescriptive attitude concerning some social practice. The attitude may be in principle unexceptionable, but at the same time may be based on intellectual foundations which logically support policies and specific practices inconsistent with the general prescriptive attitude. A philosopher is at least in a position to expose this kind of inconsistency, and has a role to play in rebuilding the foundations and showing how these can support the sorts of policies and practices which are consistent with the attitude. A particularly apt example of this is multicultural education. Most people who think about it are in favour of it; I shall assume that their motives are as often as not unimpeachable; nevertheless the rationale for much prescriptive talk in this area is obscure or-as I http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Philosophy of Education Oxford University Press

Multicultural Education: what kind of relativism is possible?

Zec, Paul
Journal of Philosophy of Education , Volume 14 (1) – Jun 1, 1980
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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
Copyright © 1980 Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
ISSN
0309-8249
eISSN
1467-9752
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9752.1980.tb00542.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Multicultural Education: what kind of relativism is possible? No discussion of multicultural education at a philosophical level should seek to mask the wretched experience, for many of our newer settlers and their children, of social and economic inequality rendered more damaging by racial prejudice and discrimination. But Karl Marx may only have been partly right when he denied that philosophy could change the world. A philosopher is, let us suppose, confronted with a prescriptive attitude concerning some social practice. The attitude may be in principle unexceptionable, but at the same time may be based on intellectual foundations which logically support policies and specific practices inconsistent with the general prescriptive attitude. A philosopher is at least in a position to expose this kind of inconsistency, and has a role to play in rebuilding the foundations and showing how these can support the sorts of policies and practices which are consistent with the attitude. A particularly apt example of this is multicultural education. Most people who think about it are in favour of it; I shall assume that their motives are as often as not unimpeachable; nevertheless the rationale for much prescriptive talk in this area is obscure or-as I

Journal

Journal of Philosophy of Education – Oxford University Press

Published: Jun 1, 1980

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