Systemic Disequilibrium, Foreign Policy Role, and the Power CycleDoran, Charles F.
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003001pmid: N/A
Confronting widespread ambiguities of theory and research design, this article establishes conditions underlying international political stability for state and system. In turn, it (1) dissects the cycle of relative power and role to elucidate the concept of general equilibrium, depicting graphically the trauma of role adjustment that accompanies critical changes in relative power; (2) compares the empirical results for transitions and critical points using the same set of data; (3) shows mathematically that inversions in the trend of slope can approximate critical intervals; and (4) demonstrates via diagrams of each state's critical change why the disequilibrated system 1885-1914 succumbed to massive world war. Empirical research on systems transformation and major war must incorporate both strategic power balancing and power-role equilibration for states in the central system in a broader concept like general equilibrium.
Predicting Soviet Military InterventionKaw, Marita
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003002pmid: N/A
This article attempts to explain and predict Soviet intervention in conflicts abroad during 1950-1987. I constructed a geopolitics driven model of Soviet calculus for intervention to predict which of four levels of intervention will be undertaken: verbal/diplomatic or less, arms delivery, limited personnel, or large-scale personnel support. When tested on 403 diverse civil and interstate conflicts adapted from the Correlates of War and Conflict and Peace Data Bank projects, the model proved correct in 88% of the cases. Two other predictive rules — the Modal and the Mirror Image alternatives — were also tested and used as baselines for comparison. The results show Moscow rarely wields the sword except to rescue an embattled ally or a potential client. Although it intervened more frequently during the 1970s, an increase in the number of beleaguered clients seems to account for the trendline. The findings offer useful correctives to Cold War and Mirror Image theories.
Crisis Decision Making ReconsideredWelch, David A.
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003003pmid: N/A
Serious problems may be found in Herek, Janis, and Huth's 1987 study of the relationship between the quality of the decision-making process in an international crisis and the desirability of its outcome. A closer look at the best understood and most thoroughly documented case used in their study (the Cuban missile crisis of 1962) reveals the chief cause of those problems to be the use of sources that appear to be incomplete in the light of new evidence. Both the conclusions of the Herek, Janis, and Huth study and the criteria with which they assess the quality of a decision-making process are called into question.
Solving Public Good Problems in Competition Between Equal and Unequal Size GroupsRapoport, Amnon; Bornstein, Gary
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003005pmid: N/A
Forty-eight groups participated once in an intergroup conflict in which two groups of equal or unequal size competed for the provision of step-level (binary) public goods. The study included a two-factorial design with preplay communication versus no preplay communication defining one dimension, and equal group size versus unequal group size defining the other. The decision to contribute or not toward the provision of the good was made privately and anonymously. Both the relative group size and communication conditions affected the level of contribution. The findings support a model predicting that within-group discussion results in a two-person game between the two groups, each of which uses the maximin criterion to designate a number of contributors. This criterion does not necessarily maximize group reward, enhance contribution, or guarantee efficient provision of the good.
A Twist of TruthMorrow, James D.
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003007pmid: N/A
This article considers the effects of arms races on the occurrence of wars. Existing evidence on the link between arms races and wars suggests that arms races do not necessarily cause wars, but that some arms races end in war and others do not. Why? This article proposes an answer to this question by examining the motivations of each racing nation to go to war by expressing those motivations in utility terms. Swings in military superiority between the racing powers provoked by the race create a motivation for war to exploit temporary advantages. Risk-acceptant actors are more likely to initiate arms race wars, and risk-averse actors are more likely to resist their threats. The conclusions of the argument are tested and supported robustly but not strongly.
Extensions of Value Solutions in Constant-Sum Non-Sidepayment GamesMichener, H. Andrew; Salzer, Mark S.; Richardson, Greg D.
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003008pmid: N/A
This article defines two new solution concepts for non-sidepayment games - the λ-transfer nucleolus and the λ-transfer disruption value - and reports the results of an experiment testing their predictive accuracy against that of a third solution concept, the well-known λ-transfer value (Shapley, 1969). The test was based on data from a laboratory experiment utilizing five-person, two-choice games that were constant-sum in normal form. Goodness-of-fit results show that the λ-transfer value and the λ-transfer disruption value were about equally accurate in predicting the observed payoffs to players in these games; both of these solutions were more accurate than the λ-transfer nucleolus.
Conflict Management in Mature RivalryKuenne, Robert E.
doi: 10.1177/0022002789033003009pmid: N/A
Rivalry is a form of conflict in which relatively few opponents must make decisions in full knowledge that rivals will perceive those decisions as interfering to a greater or lesser extent with their welfares. Actors' autonomous actions must be undertaken only after opponents' potential reactions have discounted the favorable effects on the initiating agent's welfare in the absence of such reactions. This paper defines an environment of mature rivalry in which this prospective interaction of decisions takes place in a manner that restrains conflict through the fostering of mind-sets, institutions, and conditions that enhance cooperation. The role of uncertainty is featured as a facilitator of these stabilizing tendencies. A formal framework for analyzing the solution process in contexts of mature rivalry is presented using the theory of rivalrous consonance.