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A Delineation of Nietzshe's Conception of Free Will Willing liberates!--thus I teach you f[reedom] o[f the] w[ill] --KSA 10.371 Introduction ietzsche researchers and historians of philosophy alike rarely pay attention to the philosopher's account of the problem of determinism and free will.1 In like manner, in the research on determinism and free will, Nietzsche's view on the topic is seldom mentioned, let alone analyzed. Although the passages in which Nietzsche discusses the issue explicitly are not numerous, his ideas are original. At face value, though, his use of the notion of free will is inconsistent: on the one hand, he rejects free will as the ultimate cause of human action; on the other hand, he attributes a positive connotation to freedom of the will. The aim of this essay is to pinpoint and investigate both the positive and negative statements on free will and to disentangle Nietzsche's ambivalence on this topic. The theoretical frame and structure of the paper are inspired by the contemporary debate in analytical philosophy on the problem of determinism and free will. The concept of free will is typically opposed to the idea of determinism. The pivotal question in the historical and contemporary discussion
The Journal of Nietzsche Studies – Penn State University Press
Published: Jun 14, 2006
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