ABSTRACT This paper presents an information‐theoretic model of IPO pricing in which insiders sell stock in both the IPO and the secondary market, have private information about their firm's prospects, and outsiders may engage in costly information production about the firm. High‐value firms, knowing they are going to pool with low‐value firms, induce outsiders to engage in information production by underpricing, which compensates outsiders for the cost of producing information. The information is reflected in the secondary market price of equity, giving a higher expected stock price for high‐value firms.
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 1993
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