The optimal control of Axelrod's social norm game

The optimal control of Axelrod's social norm game In this paper, we study the well‐known Axelrod's social norm game using replicator dynamics and control theory. In general, a social norm game has 4 pure strategies: norm following and norm defecting, each of which branching further into punishing or not punishing others for defection, if observed. Our aim is to check whether by introducing a control parameter that mimics incentives for players who follow the norm, we observe changes in the dynamics of the strategy game, which maximize norm‐following strategies. We solve the control problem numerically and find that incentives and the capacity of individuals to observe others' defection both have an impact on the emergence of Nash equilibria in which norm following is dominant. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Optimal Control Applications and Methods Wiley

The optimal control of Axelrod's social norm game

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Publisher
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
ISSN
0143-2087
eISSN
1099-1514
D.O.I.
10.1002/oca.2390
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

In this paper, we study the well‐known Axelrod's social norm game using replicator dynamics and control theory. In general, a social norm game has 4 pure strategies: norm following and norm defecting, each of which branching further into punishing or not punishing others for defection, if observed. Our aim is to check whether by introducing a control parameter that mimics incentives for players who follow the norm, we observe changes in the dynamics of the strategy game, which maximize norm‐following strategies. We solve the control problem numerically and find that incentives and the capacity of individuals to observe others' defection both have an impact on the emergence of Nash equilibria in which norm following is dominant.

Journal

Optimal Control Applications and MethodsWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2018

Keywords: ; ; ;

References

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