In this paper, we study the well‐known Axelrod's social norm game using replicator dynamics and control theory. In general, a social norm game has 4 pure strategies: norm following and norm defecting, each of which branching further into punishing or not punishing others for defection, if observed. Our aim is to check whether by introducing a control parameter that mimics incentives for players who follow the norm, we observe changes in the dynamics of the strategy game, which maximize norm‐following strategies. We solve the control problem numerically and find that incentives and the capacity of individuals to observe others' defection both have an impact on the emergence of Nash equilibria in which norm following is dominant.
Optimal Control Applications and Methods – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2018
Keywords: ; ; ;
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