Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free‐rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business‐stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Industrial Economics Wiley

STRATEGIC INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND COMPETITION FOR AN IMPERFECTLY PROTECTED INNOVATION

The Journal of Industrial Economics , Volume 58 (2) – Jun 1, 2010

Loading next page...
 
/lp/wiley/strategic-information-disclosure-and-competition-for-an-imperfectly-QCNTZ070yW

References (81)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2010 The Author. Journal compilation © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. and the Editorial Board of The Journal of Industrial Economics
ISSN
0022-1821
eISSN
1467-6451
DOI
10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00417.x
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The imperfect appropriability of revenues from innovation affects the incentives of firms to invest, and to disclose information about their innovative productivity. It creates a free‐rider effect in the competition for the innovation that countervails the familiar business‐stealing effect. Moreover, it affects the disclosure incentives such that full disclosure emerges for extreme revenue spillovers (e.g., full protection and no protection of intellectual property), but either partial disclosure or full concealment emerges for intermediate spillovers. I analyze the implications of imperfect appropriability and strategic disclosure for the firms' profits and the probability of innovation.

Journal

The Journal of Industrial EconomicsWiley

Published: Jun 1, 2010

There are no references for this article.