Ownership structure, corporate governance and institutional environment: Going beyond managerial opportunism and the principal‐agent framework

Ownership structure, corporate governance and institutional environment: Going beyond managerial... Building on the empirical evidence collected by Berle and Means () at the beginning of the twentieth century, the corporate governance (CG) literature has been dominated by studies exploring the negative consequences of ownership dispersion in large public companies (Shleifer & Vishny, ). Using samples from Anglo‐American institutional settings and building their theoretical framework on agency theory, governance scholars have developed a number of studies investigating the conflict of interests between top managers and minority shareholders (i.e., the principal‐agent problem) and their negative impact on firm performance (Kumar & Zattoni, ).More recently, empirical evidence collected from several countries around the world has highlighted that—outside Anglo‐American countries—listed companies have a concentrated ownership structure and control is in the hands of one or few shareholders, usually a family or the state (e.g., La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, ; Zattoni & Judge, ). These companies are affected by a different agency problem, namely, the conflict of interests between controlling and minority shareholders (i.e., a principal‐principal problem) and its potential negative impact on firm performance (Aslan & Kumar, Kumar & Zattoni, ).The investigation of ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms outside the Anglo‐American countries has allowed scholars to understand the variety of http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Corporate Governance Wiley

Ownership structure, corporate governance and institutional environment: Going beyond managerial opportunism and the principal‐agent framework

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Publisher
Wiley Subscription Services, Inc., A Wiley Company
Copyright
© 2018 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
ISSN
0964-8410
eISSN
1467-8683
D.O.I.
10.1111/corg.12232
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Building on the empirical evidence collected by Berle and Means () at the beginning of the twentieth century, the corporate governance (CG) literature has been dominated by studies exploring the negative consequences of ownership dispersion in large public companies (Shleifer & Vishny, ). Using samples from Anglo‐American institutional settings and building their theoretical framework on agency theory, governance scholars have developed a number of studies investigating the conflict of interests between top managers and minority shareholders (i.e., the principal‐agent problem) and their negative impact on firm performance (Kumar & Zattoni, ).More recently, empirical evidence collected from several countries around the world has highlighted that—outside Anglo‐American countries—listed companies have a concentrated ownership structure and control is in the hands of one or few shareholders, usually a family or the state (e.g., La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, ; Zattoni & Judge, ). These companies are affected by a different agency problem, namely, the conflict of interests between controlling and minority shareholders (i.e., a principal‐principal problem) and its potential negative impact on firm performance (Aslan & Kumar, Kumar & Zattoni, ).The investigation of ownership structures and corporate governance mechanisms outside the Anglo‐American countries has allowed scholars to understand the variety of

Journal

Corporate GovernanceWiley

Published: Jan 1, 2018

References

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