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- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- 1992 The American Finance Association
- ISSN
- 0022-1082
- eISSN
- 1540-6261
- DOI
- 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1992.tb03981.x
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
ABSTRACT The conventional view of going‐private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm (for example, Jensen (1986)). A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders (Shleifer and Summers (1988)). This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. We conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of LBO‐related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efficiency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests.
Journal
The Journal of Finance – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 1992