In labor markets where few companies compete for many workers, economic theory predicts monopsony rents. Surprisingly, soccer clubs do not profit from the expected rents. The purpose of this study is to explain such contradictory evidence. Our model and empirical test, using data obtained from the Spanish professional soccer league for the season 2001/2002, suggests that monopsony rents that the clubs were to obtain from most of the soccer players would eventually revert to the superstars. The study also illustrates that the market value of players stems both from their sporting performance and their economic contribution. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Managerial and Decision Economics – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2007
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