Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
Loading next page...
/lp/wiley/emerging-in-determinacy-18UoRoYH87
References (22)
-
J. Barrett (1999)
The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds -
Matti Eklund (2008)
Deconstructing Ontological VaguenessCanadian Journal of Philosophy, 38
-
Bradford Skow (2010)
DEEP METAPHYSICAL INDETERMINACYThe Philosophical Quarterly, 60
-
K. Hawley (2001)
How Things Persist -
Elizabeth Barnes (2010)
Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed1Noûs, 44
-
Richard Woodward (2011)
Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vague Existence -
Ken Akiba (2004)
Vagueness in the WorldNoûs, 38
-
M. Tye (1990)
Vague Objects, 99
-
K. Fine (2001)
The Question of Realism, 1
-
Barnes (2011)
177Philosophical Perspectives, 10
-
Elizabeth Barnes (2010)
Arguments Against Metaphysical Indeterminacy and VaguenessPhilosophy Compass, 5
-
Tuomas Tahko (2014)
Boring Infinite DescentMetaphilosophy, 45
-
Barnes (2014)
339Analytic Philosophy, 55
-
R. Bliss (2013)
Viciousness and the structure of realityPhilosophical Studies, 166
-
R. Cameron (2007)
Turtles all the Way Down: Regress, Priority and FundamentalityThe Philosophical Quarterly, 58
-
J. Schaffer (2003)
Is There a Fundamental LevelNoûs, 37
-
T. Merricks (2001)
Varieties of VaguenessPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62
-
M. Heller (1996)
Against Metaphysical VaguenessPhilosophical Perspectives, 10
-
E. Barnes (2014)
Fundamental Indeterminacy, 55
-
E. Barnes, J. R. G. Williams (2011)
A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy, 10
-
J. Schaffer (2009)
Metametaphysics -
K. Bennett (2011)
By Our BootstrapsPhilosophical Perspectives, 25
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Copyright
- © 2018 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- ISSN
- 2161-2234
- eISSN
- 2161-2234
- DOI
- 10.1002/tht3.266
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
In recent years, a number of authors have defended the coherence and philosophical utility of the notion of metaphysical indeterminacy. Concurrently, the idea that reality can be stratified into more or less fundamental ‘levels’ has gained significant traction in the literature. Here, I examine the relationship between these two notions. Specifically, I consider the question of what metaphysical (in)determinacy at one level of reality tells us about the possibility of metaphysical (in)determinacy at other more or less fundamental levels. Towards this end, I propose a novel conception of the way in which fundamental states of affairs determine derivative states of affairs in the presence of indeterminacy and construct a corresponding formal model of multilevel systems that demonstrates the compatibility of determinacy at the fundamental level with indeterminacy at higher levels (and vice versa), thereby rebutting Barnes' (2014) suggestion that indeterminacy at any level of reality implies indeterminacy at the fundamental level.
Journal
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy – Wiley
Published: Jan 1, 2018
Keywords: ; ;