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Abstract. This study investigates the relation between disclosure policy and liquidity in equity markets. Disclosure policy influences market liquidity because uninformed investors “price protect” against adverse selection, and this price protection is manifested in market liquidity. Bid‐ask spreads, the empirical measure of market liquidity used in this study, are predicted to be inversely related to disclosure policy. In addition, increased trading by informed traders and higher probability of information event occurrence are predicted to both increase spreads and intensify the relation between spreads and disclosure policy. These predictions apply during periods in which no news about the firm is disclosed or pending. The results show that relative bid‐ask spreads for firms with disclosure rankings in the bottom third of the empirical distribution are approximately 50 percent higher than spreads for firms with disclosure rankings in the top third of the empirical distribution. Tests that assume endogenous disclosure policy reveal a significant negative relation between disclosure policy and spreads, even after controlling for the effects of return volatility, trading volume, and share price. Tests for cross‐sectional variation in spreads and for the sensitivity of spreads to disclosure policy based on informed trade activity and probability of information event occurrence are generally consistent with the predictions, though these results are not statistically significant. The findings of this study are consistent with the notion that a well‐regarded disclosure policy reduces information asymmetry and hence increases liquidity in equity markets. Résumé. L'auteur analyse la relation entre la politique d'information et la liquidité des marchés d'actions. La politique d'information influe sur la liquidité du marché, étant donné que les investisseurs non informés se protègent contre les choix préjudiciables en ce qui a trait aux cours, comportement de protection qui se manifeste dans la liquidité du marché. Les écarts entre les cours acheteur et vendeur, la mesure empirique de la liquidité du marché utilisée dans la présente étude, devraient présenter, selon les prévisions, une relation inverse avec la politique d'information. De plus, l'intensification de l'activité des négociateurs informés et la probabilité accrue de l'occurrence d'un événement d'information devraient, selon les prévisions, augmenter tous les deux les écarts et consolider la relation entre les écarts et la politique d'information. Ces prévisions s'appliquent aux cours des périodes dans lesquelles aucune information nouvelle au sujet de l'entreprise n'est publiée ou n'est sur le point de l'être. Les résultats démontrent que les écarts relatifs entre cours acheteur et vendeur des entreprises dont la publication d'information les place dans le tiers inférieur de la distribution empirique sont d'environ 50 pour cent supérieurs aux écarts des entreprises dont la publication d'information les place dans le tiers supérieur de la distribution empirique. Les tests qui supposent une politique d'information endogène révèlent une relation négative significative entre la politique d'information et les écarts, même après avoir contrôlé les conséquences de la volatilité du rendement, le volume des opérations et le cours de l'action. Les tests relatifs à la variation transversale des écarts et de la sensibilité des écarts à la politique d'information, basée sur l'activité de négociation informée et la probabilité d'occurrence d'un événement d'information, sont généralement conformes aux prévisions, bien que les résultats n'en soient pas statistiquement significatifs. Les conclusions de l'étude confirment le principe selon lequel une politique d'information bien pensée réduit l'asymétrie de l'information et, par conséquent, augmente la liquidité des marchés d'actions.
Contemporary Accounting Research – Wiley
Published: Mar 1, 1995
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