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Contrastivism and Negative Reason Existentials

Contrastivism and Negative Reason Existentials Snedegar (2013a) offers a contrastivist solution to the puzzle about negative reason existentials (initially presented in Schroeder 2007), which he argues is preferable to Schroeder's own pragmatic solution. The proposed solution however raises a difficulty for contrastivism, as it suggests an alternative according to which the relevant contrast classes are determined not by the semantics of reason ascriptions but rather by pragmatic effects of (intonational) contrastive stress. Nevertheless, I suggest there is a contrastivist‐friendly solution to the puzzle. In what follows, I explain the problem for Snedegar's account, and I offer an alternative solution to the problem of negative reason existentials. I argue that the solution is well‐motivated by a feature of Snedegar's own account, and that it is also compatible with Schroeder's pragmatic account. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Thought: A Journal of Philosophy Wiley

Contrastivism and Negative Reason Existentials

Gilbertson, Eric
Thought: A Journal of Philosophy , Volume 7 (1) – Jan 1, 2018
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References (15)

Publisher
Wiley
Copyright
© 2018 The Thought Trust and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
ISSN
2161-2234
eISSN
2161-2234
DOI
10.1002/tht3.270
Publisher site
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Abstract

Snedegar (2013a) offers a contrastivist solution to the puzzle about negative reason existentials (initially presented in Schroeder 2007), which he argues is preferable to Schroeder's own pragmatic solution. The proposed solution however raises a difficulty for contrastivism, as it suggests an alternative according to which the relevant contrast classes are determined not by the semantics of reason ascriptions but rather by pragmatic effects of (intonational) contrastive stress. Nevertheless, I suggest there is a contrastivist‐friendly solution to the puzzle. In what follows, I explain the problem for Snedegar's account, and I offer an alternative solution to the problem of negative reason existentials. I argue that the solution is well‐motivated by a feature of Snedegar's own account, and that it is also compatible with Schroeder's pragmatic account.

Journal

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy – Wiley

Published: Jan 1, 2018

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