Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

Does the Existence of a Public Good Enhance Cooperation among Users of Common-Pool Resources?

Does the Existence of a Public Good Enhance Cooperation among Users of Common-Pool Resources? Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage sequential game, the harvesting of a renewable natural resource takes place at the first stage. The observed harvesting surplus is then used for buying private goods and contributing to public goods at the second stage. In this setting, the model shows that the harvesters share an individual objective of maximizing total harvesting surplus. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Land Economics University of Wisconsin Press

Does the Existence of a Public Good Enhance Cooperation among Users of Common-Pool Resources?

Solstad, Jan Tore.; Brekke, Kjell Arne.
Land Economics , Volume 87 (2) – Apr 4, 2012
Download PDF
12 pages

Loading next page...
 
/lp/university-of-wisconsin-press/does-the-existence-of-a-public-good-enhance-cooperation-among-users-of-BcnufVVp9L

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
University of Wisconsin Press
ISSN
1543-8325

Abstract

Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage sequential game, the harvesting of a renewable natural resource takes place at the first stage. The observed harvesting surplus is then used for buying private goods and contributing to public goods at the second stage. In this setting, the model shows that the harvesters share an individual objective of maximizing total harvesting surplus.

Journal

Land Economics – University of Wisconsin Press

Published: Apr 4, 2012

There are no references for this article.