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Hobbes on Explanation and Understanding

Hobbes on Explanation and Understanding Hobbes on Explanation and Understanding Ioli Patellis One aspect of Hobbes’s philosophy of science which has not been explored in any depth is his view of the explanatory import of science. This is possibly because of the important passages in Hobbes awarding primary, if not sole, significance to the practical dimension of scientific knowledge, i.e., to science as a means of controlling and manipulating nature, an emphasis which is in tune with the general prudential tenor of Hobbes’s philosophy. In addition the Hobbe- sian view of explanation seems straightforward enough: one explains a phenom- enon when one assigns a cause to it. On the face of it there does not seem much more to be said about the matter. Hobbesian science explains because it pro- vides knowledge of causes and causes explain because that is what causes do by definition. A problem with the explanatory force of causes arises when one sur- veys the great variety of conceptions of causality which have been proposed. Do they all have explanatory value and for the same reasons? Are Aristotelian causes and Humean ones of equal explanatory import and in virtue of the same traits? The case of Hobbes is of particular http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of the History of Ideas University of Pennsylvania Press

Hobbes on Explanation and Understanding

Journal of the History of Ideas , Volume 62 (3) – Jul 1, 2001

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Publisher
University of Pennsylvania Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2001 The Journal of the History of Ideas, Inc.
ISSN
1086-3222

Abstract

Hobbes on Explanation and Understanding Ioli Patellis One aspect of Hobbes’s philosophy of science which has not been explored in any depth is his view of the explanatory import of science. This is possibly because of the important passages in Hobbes awarding primary, if not sole, significance to the practical dimension of scientific knowledge, i.e., to science as a means of controlling and manipulating nature, an emphasis which is in tune with the general prudential tenor of Hobbes’s philosophy. In addition the Hobbe- sian view of explanation seems straightforward enough: one explains a phenom- enon when one assigns a cause to it. On the face of it there does not seem much more to be said about the matter. Hobbesian science explains because it pro- vides knowledge of causes and causes explain because that is what causes do by definition. A problem with the explanatory force of causes arises when one sur- veys the great variety of conceptions of causality which have been proposed. Do they all have explanatory value and for the same reasons? Are Aristotelian causes and Humean ones of equal explanatory import and in virtue of the same traits? The case of Hobbes is of particular

Journal

Journal of the History of IdeasUniversity of Pennsylvania Press

Published: Jul 1, 2001

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