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Agriculture and the Confederacy: Policy, Productivity, and Power in the Civil War South by R. Douglas Hurt (review)

Agriculture and the Confederacy: Policy, Productivity, and Power in the Civil War South by R.... who argue that Confederate cavalry raids were usually unable to achieve more than temporary disruptions to Union rail lines. Sherman, Hess argues, achieved the greatest success of any field commander when it came to disrupting enemy logistics during his march across Georgia and the Carolinas in the final year of the war. The great majority of Hess’s analysis focuses on Union transportation systems. Hess claims that this was “not by design but by necessity,” the Federal logistical system being “far larger . . . and far better documented than its counterpart in the South” (xiv). The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Hess rightfully points out, contains a wealth of material on northern quartermaster work and far less on Confederate activities. While describing bureaucratic differences that contributed to the dispar - ity between the volume of surviving Confederate and Union records, Hess also makes the somewhat dubious claim that “Rebel officers were terrible record keepers,” offering only a single example to support his point (31). Unfortunately, Hess fails to mention the widespread destruction and dis- persal of Confederate government records at the end of the Civil War as a major reason for the paucity of southern records. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of the Civil War Era University of North Carolina Press

Agriculture and the Confederacy: Policy, Productivity, and Power in the Civil War South by R. Douglas Hurt (review)

The Journal of the Civil War Era , Volume 8 (4) – Dec 3, 2018

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Publisher
University of North Carolina Press
Copyright
Copyright @ The University of North Carolina Press
ISSN
2159-9807

Abstract

who argue that Confederate cavalry raids were usually unable to achieve more than temporary disruptions to Union rail lines. Sherman, Hess argues, achieved the greatest success of any field commander when it came to disrupting enemy logistics during his march across Georgia and the Carolinas in the final year of the war. The great majority of Hess’s analysis focuses on Union transportation systems. Hess claims that this was “not by design but by necessity,” the Federal logistical system being “far larger . . . and far better documented than its counterpart in the South” (xiv). The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, Hess rightfully points out, contains a wealth of material on northern quartermaster work and far less on Confederate activities. While describing bureaucratic differences that contributed to the dispar - ity between the volume of surviving Confederate and Union records, Hess also makes the somewhat dubious claim that “Rebel officers were terrible record keepers,” offering only a single example to support his point (31). Unfortunately, Hess fails to mention the widespread destruction and dis- persal of Confederate government records at the end of the Civil War as a major reason for the paucity of southern records.

Journal

The Journal of the Civil War EraUniversity of North Carolina Press

Published: Dec 3, 2018

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