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Affekt, Gefühl, Empfindung : Rereading Freud on the Question of Unconscious Affects

Affekt, Gefühl, Empfindung : Rereading Freud on the Question of Unconscious Affects Affekt, Gefühl, Empfindung Rereading Freud on the Question of Unconscious Affects adrian johnston If, as Aristotle famously declares in the Metaphysics, wonder is the source driving philosophizing, then a further specification should be immediately added to this: wonder, a compelling, captivating feeling that is experienced as a light, gentle yearning or exhilaration, is the affective motor behind the speculative endeavors of theoretical philosophy.1 That is to say, if wonder is a fundamental philosophical affect, it's fundamental primarily to those parts of philosophy moved principally by a "desire to understand" (epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, logic, etc.). But, what about the significant other dimension of philosophy? In other words, what about practical philosophy (ethics, politics, etc.) as concerned not so much with "What can I know?" but rather with "What should I do?" Guilt is one of the main candidates for being to practical philosophy what wonder is to theoretical philosophy, namely, a foundational affect as a catalyst for the deliberations, decisions, and deeds of concern to philosophy's prescriptions. If guilt indeed is a fundamental philosophical affect in relation to ethics--at least in Kant's shadow, it certainly seems to be--then Freud's psychoanalytic discoveries and their aftershocks (both within post-Freudian psychoanalytic movements http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social Sciences University of Nebraska Press

Affekt, Gefühl, Empfindung : Rereading Freud on the Question of Unconscious Affects

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University of Nebraska Press
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Copyright © University of Nebraska Press
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Abstract

Affekt, Gefühl, Empfindung Rereading Freud on the Question of Unconscious Affects adrian johnston If, as Aristotle famously declares in the Metaphysics, wonder is the source driving philosophizing, then a further specification should be immediately added to this: wonder, a compelling, captivating feeling that is experienced as a light, gentle yearning or exhilaration, is the affective motor behind the speculative endeavors of theoretical philosophy.1 That is to say, if wonder is a fundamental philosophical affect, it's fundamental primarily to those parts of philosophy moved principally by a "desire to understand" (epistemology, ontology, metaphysics, logic, etc.). But, what about the significant other dimension of philosophy? In other words, what about practical philosophy (ethics, politics, etc.) as concerned not so much with "What can I know?" but rather with "What should I do?" Guilt is one of the main candidates for being to practical philosophy what wonder is to theoretical philosophy, namely, a foundational affect as a catalyst for the deliberations, decisions, and deeds of concern to philosophy's prescriptions. If guilt indeed is a fundamental philosophical affect in relation to ethics--at least in Kant's shadow, it certainly seems to be--then Freud's psychoanalytic discoveries and their aftershocks (both within post-Freudian psychoanalytic movements

Journal

Qui Parle: Critical Humanities and Social SciencesUniversity of Nebraska Press

Published: May 21, 2010

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