Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

On the Imperviousness of Persons: A Reply to Jan Olof Bengtsson

On the Imperviousness of Persons: A Reply to Jan Olof Bengtsson discussion On the Imperviousness of Persons: A Reply to Jan Olof Bengtsson phillip ferreir a Kutztown University I. as r egul ar r e aders of The Pluralist are aware, there appeared in 2008 an issue devoted to Jan Olof Bengtsson’s The Worldview of Personalism. The issue included five articles, each concerned with a different aspect of the book; and after each article, there was a “Reply” by Bengtsson. In what fol- lows, I shall say something about Bengtsson’s reply to my own contribution, “Absolute and Personal Idealism.” However, first let me briefly describe that article’s argument. In “Absolute and Personal Idealism,” I examined the personalist attack on absolutism as formulated by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison in two works: Hegelianism and Personality and The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Phi- losophy. In the first section of my article, I argued that Pringle-Pattison had largely failed to grasp the central idea of Hegel’s Logic—particularly Hegel’s conception of the absolute. According to Pringle-Pattison (and most personal- ists), the Hegelian absolute is “impersonal” in nature, and it falsifies the true relation between finite individuality and reality as a whole. In the second half of my discussion, the focus shifted to http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Pluralist University of Illinois Press

On the Imperviousness of Persons: A Reply to Jan Olof Bengtsson

The Pluralist , Volume 6 – Mar 18, 2011

Loading next page...
 
/lp/university-of-illinois-press/on-the-imperviousness-of-persons-a-reply-to-jan-olof-bengtsson-BWORtbHnuE
Publisher
University of Illinois Press
Copyright
Copyright © Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
ISSN
1944-6489

Abstract

discussion On the Imperviousness of Persons: A Reply to Jan Olof Bengtsson phillip ferreir a Kutztown University I. as r egul ar r e aders of The Pluralist are aware, there appeared in 2008 an issue devoted to Jan Olof Bengtsson’s The Worldview of Personalism. The issue included five articles, each concerned with a different aspect of the book; and after each article, there was a “Reply” by Bengtsson. In what fol- lows, I shall say something about Bengtsson’s reply to my own contribution, “Absolute and Personal Idealism.” However, first let me briefly describe that article’s argument. In “Absolute and Personal Idealism,” I examined the personalist attack on absolutism as formulated by Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison in two works: Hegelianism and Personality and The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Phi- losophy. In the first section of my article, I argued that Pringle-Pattison had largely failed to grasp the central idea of Hegel’s Logic—particularly Hegel’s conception of the absolute. According to Pringle-Pattison (and most personal- ists), the Hegelian absolute is “impersonal” in nature, and it falsifies the true relation between finite individuality and reality as a whole. In the second half of my discussion, the focus shifted to

Journal

The PluralistUniversity of Illinois Press

Published: Mar 18, 2011

There are no references for this article.