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Gordon W. Allport’s Concept of the Human Person: On a Possible Dialogue between Philosophy and Psychology andrzej jastrzebski, omi Pontifical University of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Rome for many years, modern social science and philosophy have been a battle- field of conflicting visions of the human person. There are many armies involved in this fight—among them the personalists who, even among themselves, rep- resent different approaches to the understanding of the human person. G. W. Allport states that both philosophy and psychology are interested in the same common subject matter—that is, the human person. Allport’s statement in this regard is very clear: personalistic psychology and philoso- phy must join forces to fight against the reduction of the human person to a mere football or an academic pawn. We have to acknowledge an interior power of self-directedness in the human person. This article is an attempt to evaluate the relevance of Allport’s psycho- logical concept of the human to philosophy, but in particular to philosophi- cal personalism, for, as he says, it is “inconceivable that two intentioned disciplines working on a common subject matter can indefinitely remain apart” (Personality and Social Encounter 36). For him, both psychology and philosophy should cooperate
The Pluralist – University of Illinois Press
Published: Mar 18, 2011
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