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Cultural intentions, Reference, and Art

Cultural intentions, Reference, and Art Abstract: Cultural intentions, understood as enabling conditions, some physical and technological, others conceptual and theoretical, make it possible for artists to create the artworks they create. These intentions play an ineliminable role in the mechanism of reference for artifact-kind terms, including art. Because of the crucial role that cultural intentions play in the mechanism of reference for artifact-kind terms, the reference of such terms cannot be properly understood in the same way as the reference of natural-kind terms, for intentions of any kind do not play a role in the reference of such terms as gold or water. I therefore reject the claim made by Hilary Putnam and others that the mechanism of reference for the two kinds of terms can be understood in the same way, while allowing, especially where art is concerned, that two of Putnam's ideas--the idea of a test known to experts and the idea of stereotypes--are applicable in discussions of artworks. Where art is concerned, we need something like the traditional account of reference that has been widely rejected in discussions of the reference of natural-kind terms. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Aesthetic Education University of Illinois Press

Cultural intentions, Reference, and Art

The Journal of Aesthetic Education , Volume 51 (2) – May 4, 2017

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Publisher
University of Illinois Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois.
ISSN
1543-7809
Publisher site
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Abstract

Abstract: Cultural intentions, understood as enabling conditions, some physical and technological, others conceptual and theoretical, make it possible for artists to create the artworks they create. These intentions play an ineliminable role in the mechanism of reference for artifact-kind terms, including art. Because of the crucial role that cultural intentions play in the mechanism of reference for artifact-kind terms, the reference of such terms cannot be properly understood in the same way as the reference of natural-kind terms, for intentions of any kind do not play a role in the reference of such terms as gold or water. I therefore reject the claim made by Hilary Putnam and others that the mechanism of reference for the two kinds of terms can be understood in the same way, while allowing, especially where art is concerned, that two of Putnam's ideas--the idea of a test known to experts and the idea of stereotypes--are applicable in discussions of artworks. Where art is concerned, we need something like the traditional account of reference that has been widely rejected in discussions of the reference of natural-kind terms.

Journal

The Journal of Aesthetic EducationUniversity of Illinois Press

Published: May 4, 2017

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