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A Second Reply to Phillip Ferreira

A Second Reply to Phillip Ferreira jan olof bengtsson Lund University as a philosopher r ather than a historian, Phillip Ferreira tends na- turally, in his article in this issue of The Pluralist, “On the Imperviousness of Persons,” as in his first one on The Worldview of Personalism, to place the emphasis quite as much on the general philosophical issues as on the specific historical interpretation of Pringle-Pattison. But this emphasis was from the beginning invited by my own assessment of Pringle-Pattison. I will continue here to answer Ferreira to a considerable extent in its terms, but, as a historian rather than a philosopher, I will try to use arguments which, based on my historical knowledge of them, I think would have been those of Pringle-Pattison and the other personal idealists—or, as I also call them, early personalists—with whom I deal in my book. There can be no doubt about the importance of the issues Ferreira keeps raising. But it seems to me his new article evinces more clearly than his first, the characteristic ambiguities and contradictions that the early personalists detected from the beginning in absolute idealism. Pringle-Pattison is but a late example of this, and he focused only on some of them. Not http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Pluralist University of Illinois Press

A Second Reply to Phillip Ferreira

The Pluralist , Volume 6 – Mar 18, 2011

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Publisher
University of Illinois Press
Copyright
Copyright © Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
ISSN
1944-6489

Abstract

jan olof bengtsson Lund University as a philosopher r ather than a historian, Phillip Ferreira tends na- turally, in his article in this issue of The Pluralist, “On the Imperviousness of Persons,” as in his first one on The Worldview of Personalism, to place the emphasis quite as much on the general philosophical issues as on the specific historical interpretation of Pringle-Pattison. But this emphasis was from the beginning invited by my own assessment of Pringle-Pattison. I will continue here to answer Ferreira to a considerable extent in its terms, but, as a historian rather than a philosopher, I will try to use arguments which, based on my historical knowledge of them, I think would have been those of Pringle-Pattison and the other personal idealists—or, as I also call them, early personalists—with whom I deal in my book. There can be no doubt about the importance of the issues Ferreira keeps raising. But it seems to me his new article evinces more clearly than his first, the characteristic ambiguities and contradictions that the early personalists detected from the beginning in absolute idealism. Pringle-Pattison is but a late example of this, and he focused only on some of them. Not

Journal

The PluralistUniversity of Illinois Press

Published: Mar 18, 2011

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