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The Self, Agency, and Responsibility: A Reply to Mark Siderits

The Self, Agency, and Responsibility: A Reply to Mark Siderits Notes 1 ­ Note that while Buddhist Reductionists agree with the pluralist-self view that strictly speaking there is only the series of the many causally connected psychophysical elements, they are able to circumvent this difficulty of locating a unified persisting deliberative agent. They get around the problem by appealing to the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. They would say it is conventionally true that I, a persisting substance with various powers, might have done B rather than A. For details see my "Buddhist Paleocompatibilism," Philosophy East and West 63, no. 1 (2013): 73­87. 2 ­ Here also the Buddhist Reductionist is able to circumvent the difficulty faced by the pluralist-self view. This difficulty is closely related to an objection sometimes raised against Reductionist views, one I call "Micawberism" in my Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons, 2nd ed. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2015). The idea is that in the absence of a single persisting "I," the agent is reduced to the passive state of "waiting to see what turns up." Buddhist Reductionists can use their two-scheme approach to get around this difficulty. They can agree that ultimately there are no reasons, since ultimately there are no agents. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

The Self, Agency, and Responsibility: A Reply to Mark Siderits

Philosophy East and West , Volume 67 (2) – Apr 25, 2017

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Publisher
University of Hawai'I Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 University of Hawai'i Press.
ISSN
1529-1898
Publisher site
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Abstract

Notes 1 ­ Note that while Buddhist Reductionists agree with the pluralist-self view that strictly speaking there is only the series of the many causally connected psychophysical elements, they are able to circumvent this difficulty of locating a unified persisting deliberative agent. They get around the problem by appealing to the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. They would say it is conventionally true that I, a persisting substance with various powers, might have done B rather than A. For details see my "Buddhist Paleocompatibilism," Philosophy East and West 63, no. 1 (2013): 73­87. 2 ­ Here also the Buddhist Reductionist is able to circumvent the difficulty faced by the pluralist-self view. This difficulty is closely related to an objection sometimes raised against Reductionist views, one I call "Micawberism" in my Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons, 2nd ed. (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2015). The idea is that in the absence of a single persisting "I," the agent is reduced to the passive state of "waiting to see what turns up." Buddhist Reductionists can use their two-scheme approach to get around this difficulty. They can agree that ultimately there are no reasons, since ultimately there are no agents.

Journal

Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: Apr 25, 2017

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