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Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense

Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense 3. Are all predicative or concept-enriched awarenesses linguistic or are there pre-linguistic recognitional capacities? (the controversy regarding the meaning of ´ ``avyapadesyam''). I have tried to deal with each of these controversies in three different papers,1 but the intricate argumentation between Siderits, Phillips, and Chadha has convinced me that I need now to deal with them all in one sustained investigation. Note 1 ­ See ``Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvilkalpaka Perception from Nyaya,'' Philosophy East and West 50 (1) ( January 2000), ¯ for my discussion of the first debate. See ``Perception, Apperception and NonConceptual Content,'' in Perspectives on Consciousness, ed. Amita Chatterjee (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2003), for my discussion of the second debate. And see ``Experience, Concept-Possession and Knowledge of a Language,'' in The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, ed. L. E. Hahn, Library of Living Philosophers (Chicago: Open Court, 1998), for my discussion of the third debate. Illinois State University In a recent article in this journal, Monima Chadha claimed that the position of certain Buddhist philosophers concerning the perception of particulars is incoherent.1 Her defense of what she calls a ``Nyaya-Kantian'' position raises interesting questions ¯ concerning how we have knowledge http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

Perceiving Particulars: A Buddhist Defense

Philosophy East and West , Volume 54 (3) – May 28, 2004

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Publisher
University of Hawai'I Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2004 University of Hawai'i Press.
ISSN
1529-1898
Publisher site
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Abstract

3. Are all predicative or concept-enriched awarenesses linguistic or are there pre-linguistic recognitional capacities? (the controversy regarding the meaning of ´ ``avyapadesyam''). I have tried to deal with each of these controversies in three different papers,1 but the intricate argumentation between Siderits, Phillips, and Chadha has convinced me that I need now to deal with them all in one sustained investigation. Note 1 ­ See ``Against Immaculate Perception: Seven Reasons for Eliminating Nirvilkalpaka Perception from Nyaya,'' Philosophy East and West 50 (1) ( January 2000), ¯ for my discussion of the first debate. See ``Perception, Apperception and NonConceptual Content,'' in Perspectives on Consciousness, ed. Amita Chatterjee (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2003), for my discussion of the second debate. And see ``Experience, Concept-Possession and Knowledge of a Language,'' in The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, ed. L. E. Hahn, Library of Living Philosophers (Chicago: Open Court, 1998), for my discussion of the third debate. Illinois State University In a recent article in this journal, Monima Chadha claimed that the position of certain Buddhist philosophers concerning the perception of particulars is incoherent.1 Her defense of what she calls a ``Nyaya-Kantian'' position raises interesting questions ¯ concerning how we have knowledge

Journal

Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: May 28, 2004

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