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On Justice: An Essay in Jewish Philosophy (review)

On Justice: An Essay in Jewish Philosophy (review) cause scientists are subjective agents susceptible to feelings or commitments that erode their ability to perform objectively. Developing an adequate theory of rationality that can transcend the context of both scientists and experiments becomes the final focus of the text in chapter 6. It is for this reason that I want to spend a little more time on the arguments in favor of the meta-rationality that Acar proposes. In chapter 6, he attempts to explain his ¸ theory of meta-rationality, without which, he claims, ``we will not be able to solve the problem [of rationality]'' (p. 159). The problem with his meta-rationality theory is that it offers no substantial help to his argument because it ultimately concludes with an acknowledgment that no meta-theory can be tested; it can only be acknowledged. Before he gets to this point, however, he moves through arguments about monism and pluralism in order to make the groundbreaking claim that his theory is ``radically different from the proposals considered [in the preceding chapters] . . . [because] it allows for a variety of conceptions of rationality and it takes none of them as the only correct one'' (p. 172). He further complicates his position http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

On Justice: An Essay in Jewish Philosophy (review)

Philosophy East and West , Volume 59 (4) – Oct 25, 2009

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University of Hawai'I Press
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Copyright © University of Hawai'I Press
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1529-1898
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Abstract

cause scientists are subjective agents susceptible to feelings or commitments that erode their ability to perform objectively. Developing an adequate theory of rationality that can transcend the context of both scientists and experiments becomes the final focus of the text in chapter 6. It is for this reason that I want to spend a little more time on the arguments in favor of the meta-rationality that Acar proposes. In chapter 6, he attempts to explain his ¸ theory of meta-rationality, without which, he claims, ``we will not be able to solve the problem [of rationality]'' (p. 159). The problem with his meta-rationality theory is that it offers no substantial help to his argument because it ultimately concludes with an acknowledgment that no meta-theory can be tested; it can only be acknowledged. Before he gets to this point, however, he moves through arguments about monism and pluralism in order to make the groundbreaking claim that his theory is ``radically different from the proposals considered [in the preceding chapters] . . . [because] it allows for a variety of conceptions of rationality and it takes none of them as the only correct one'' (p. 172). He further complicates his position

Journal

Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: Oct 25, 2009

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