It is argued here that JayarÄÅi Bhaá¹á¹a (ca. 770â830 <small class="caps">c.e </small>.) is both a CÄrvÄka and a skeptic, although he is a skeptic about epistemology rather than a skeptic about the external world or a global skeptic about knowledge. After remarks on the CÄrvÄkas and Indian skepticism, JayarÄÅiâs arguments against DignÄga and DharmakÄ«rti are considered. JayarÄÅi tries to demonstrate that in the context of epistemology, epistemology self-destructs, while in the context of everyday life there is no need for epistemology. Lastly, how JayarÄÅiâs skepticism serves his CÄrvÄka sympathies is considered.
Philosophy East and West – University of Hawai'I Press
Published: Jun 25, 2015