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Is There No Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?

Is There No Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi? Abstract: The aim of this essay is to investigate what role emotions play in moral judgment in Mengzi’s ethical thought. What is meant by ‘moral judgment’ here is basically a judgment of what is morally right and wrong in a broad sense, and this essay specifically tries to answer the question of whether ethical emotions like compassion, respect, and shame would constitute the sole source of moral judgment in Mengzi’s thought. The formulation of my leading question this way both is informed by and responds to the recent trend in Mengzi scholarship that emphasizes the positive roles emotions play in one’s ethical life. This essay critically examines David Wong’s thesis that there is no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi, and it alternatively argues that moral emotions in Mengzi provide an important but only partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

Is There No Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mengzi?

Philosophy East and West , Volume 64 (1) – Jan 24, 2014

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Publisher
University of Hawai'I Press
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 University of Hawai'i Press.
ISSN
1529-1898
Publisher site
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Abstract

Abstract: The aim of this essay is to investigate what role emotions play in moral judgment in Mengzi’s ethical thought. What is meant by ‘moral judgment’ here is basically a judgment of what is morally right and wrong in a broad sense, and this essay specifically tries to answer the question of whether ethical emotions like compassion, respect, and shame would constitute the sole source of moral judgment in Mengzi’s thought. The formulation of my leading question this way both is informed by and responds to the recent trend in Mengzi scholarship that emphasizes the positive roles emotions play in one’s ethical life. This essay critically examines David Wong’s thesis that there is no distinction between reason and emotion in Mengzi, and it alternatively argues that moral emotions in Mengzi provide an important but only partial basis for all-things-considered ethical judgment.

Journal

Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: Jan 24, 2014

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