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Huangdi Neijing: A Synopsis with Commentaries by Y. C. Kong (review)

Huangdi Neijing: A Synopsis with Commentaries by Y. C. Kong (review) 510 China Review International: Vol. 18, No. 4, 2011 should negotiate with the United States immediately aer t ft he war began. As previously noted, Moscow substantially increased its assistance to Hanoi aer 1 ft 965, improving Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. However, all was far from well between the two allies as the Vietnamese, supported by the Chinese, obdurately refused to even consider the possibility of peace talks with Washington, which the Soviets not only favored but also tried to facilitate, to no avail until 1968. Similarly, Hanoi’s decision to launch a major oen ff sive against the South in the spring of 1972, just weeks before Brezhnev was scheduled to host Nixon, jeopardized détente and embarrassed the Soviet leadership. “In March 1972, as both Beijing and Moscow adopted conciliatory policies toward Washington,” Khoo writes, “Hanoi com- plained about both Chinese and Soviet policy toward the U.S.” (p. 72). Hanoi did more than complain; it tried to explode détente by dramatically escalating and trying to win militarily the war in Vietnam. The row over peace talks and over détente adversely impacted Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Strangely, and conve- niently, the author chooses to ignore the difference between Hanoi and Moscow over both the http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png China Review International University of Hawai'I Press

Huangdi Neijing: A Synopsis with Commentaries by Y. C. Kong (review)

China Review International , Volume 18 (4) – Jan 30, 2014

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Publisher
University of Hawai'I Press
Copyright
Copyright © University of Hawai'i Press.
ISSN
1527-9367

Abstract

510 China Review International: Vol. 18, No. 4, 2011 should negotiate with the United States immediately aer t ft he war began. As previously noted, Moscow substantially increased its assistance to Hanoi aer 1 ft 965, improving Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. However, all was far from well between the two allies as the Vietnamese, supported by the Chinese, obdurately refused to even consider the possibility of peace talks with Washington, which the Soviets not only favored but also tried to facilitate, to no avail until 1968. Similarly, Hanoi’s decision to launch a major oen ff sive against the South in the spring of 1972, just weeks before Brezhnev was scheduled to host Nixon, jeopardized détente and embarrassed the Soviet leadership. “In March 1972, as both Beijing and Moscow adopted conciliatory policies toward Washington,” Khoo writes, “Hanoi com- plained about both Chinese and Soviet policy toward the U.S.” (p. 72). Hanoi did more than complain; it tried to explode détente by dramatically escalating and trying to win militarily the war in Vietnam. The row over peace talks and over détente adversely impacted Soviet-Vietnamese relations. Strangely, and conve- niently, the author chooses to ignore the difference between Hanoi and Moscow over both the

Journal

China Review InternationalUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: Jan 30, 2014

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