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Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self Edited by Irena Kuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (review)

Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self Edited by Irena Kuznetsova, Jonardon... 9­SeeGérardGranel,"Remarquessurl'accèsàlapenséedeMartinHeidegger,"Histoire de la philosophie, vol. 8, ed. François Châtelet (Paris: Hachette, 1973), pp. 179­221, esp.pp.199­204. 10­SeeGranel,"Remarques,"pp.200­201. 11­SteveOdin,"ACritiqueofthe`Kensis/nyat'MotifinNishidaandtheKyotoSchool," Buddhist-Christian Studies9(1989):71­86. Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self.EditedbyIrenaKuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad. Farnham, Surrey; Burlington,VT: AshgatePublishing,2012.Pp.255+ix.Hardcover$99.95,isbn978-1-4094-5662-9. ebookavailable. ReviewedbyStephen Phillips UniversityofTexasatAustin phillips@mail.utexas.edu "I Proudly ActandSleepWho Touched and Saw" Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self,editedbyIrenaKuznetsova, JonardonGaneri,andChakravarthiRam-Prasad,isabookbyphilosophersengaging withclassicalIndianviewsonselfandconsciousnessthatpresentsnotonlyHindu andBuddhistviewsindialoguebutalsothecontributorsindialoguewithoneanother.Eachphilosopher/scholaraddressesaperiod,school,orargumentinthelong historyofclassicalthoughtonthesubjectofself(orno-self ,andmost,itisevident, ) shareddrafts,withtheresultthatthevolumefeelslikeatextbook xceptthatthe --e papersaretoooriginalinsomeinstances.AswearetoldbyRam-Prasad(p.1),the bookwasmotivatedfromthefirstbytheeditors'sensethatwhileclassicalBuddhist viewsandargumentsonself,orno-self,andconsciousnessweregarneringwelcome attentioninanalyticphilosophy(e.g.,Sideritsetal.2011),thoseofHinduschools suchasAdvaitaandNyya,whichhavemuchtosayonthesetopics,werenot.The gap is filled here, and with papers drawing not just on these two relatively wellknownschools,AdvaitaandNyya,butalsoonSkhya,Mms,andKashmiri Shaivism.Thereisgreaterunitystill,inthatthelastpaper,byBarua,supplementing aten-pageintroductionbyRam-Prasad,presentsanoverviewoftheessays'achievements,and,indeed,throughthelensofthepapers,asunderstoodbyBarua,provides perspectiveonbroadquestionsaboutthevalueofclassicalIndianthoughtasawhole forcontemporaryphilosophicconcerns.Inotherwords,Ram-PrasadandBarua nd --a someoftheotherauthorsaswell ssumetheroleofareviewercognizantofthe --a papersasaunit.WhatIhavetosay,then,isakindofmeta-review. Barua'sidentificationofthemostvitalareasoftheclassicalliteratureonpoint seemstomelargelyontarget.Theseincludeadimensionofwhathecalls,following SarvepalliRadhakrishnan,thetrans-empirical,or,asIprefer,theyogicorcontemplative,includingrenunciantviewsofselfthathaveitasfundamentallynon-natural,as capableofhavingnothingtodowiththeworld.Thisisnottosaythatthoroughly Volume64,Number1January2014253­260 ©2014byUniversityofHawai`iPress naturalistandnon-yogicaccountsofaselfcannotbeconstructedoutoflinesofclassical reflection and argument: witness the work of Ganeri, who argues against a spectatorialmodelofatrueselforconsciousnessendorsedinbothHinduandBuddhistcontemplativetraditionsandinfavorofanembodiedselfthatisnaturalbutfor that no less sui generis in developing attitudes and emotions that matter, that are endorsed,andasendorsedbecomepartofwhatitintrinsicallyis(aviewbestexpressedinGaneri2012,achapterofwhichappearshere).Itishardlyfreshnewsbut the philosophic diversity of the classical Indian scene probably cannot be overstressed.However,thereisatendency ithinmanypapers,althoughnotinBarua's --w orthoseonearlier,practicallypre-classical,ideasaboutselfandconsciousness,by Black,Jakubczak,andBurley ooverlookcontemplativestrandsofclassicalthought --t becausetheydonotconnectwellifatallwiththedominantreflectionsonthetopics ineithertheanalyticorphenomenologicaltraditionsoftheWest.EvenBaruamisses thisfailing,andIshouldliketohighlightitwhileexaminingthebook'shandlingof themainargumentsforaself. Synchronic and diachronic cognitive syntheses, as evident in a subject's ecognitions xpressed, for example, in "This thing that is yellow has a smooth r --e feel"(unifyingoversensorymodality)and"ThisisthatDevadattaIsawyesterday" (unifyingpresentandpast) remainstaysinclassicalpro-selfargumentation,and --a theygarnerthemostattentioninthiscollection.Ourexperienceofdurationinparticular challenges Buddhist momentariness metaphysics, as several contributors hammerhome.Itisalsoproblematicwhetherevenseeminglysynchronicunitycan beunderstoodwithoutcognitivesynthesesovertime,because,asNyyainsists,attending to information from one sense faculty http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self Edited by Irena Kuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (review)

Philosophy East and West , Volume 64 (1) – Jan 24, 2014

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9­SeeGérardGranel,"Remarquessurl'accèsàlapenséedeMartinHeidegger,"Histoire de la philosophie, vol. 8, ed. François Châtelet (Paris: Hachette, 1973), pp. 179­221, esp.pp.199­204. 10­SeeGranel,"Remarques,"pp.200­201. 11­SteveOdin,"ACritiqueofthe`Kensis/nyat'MotifinNishidaandtheKyotoSchool," Buddhist-Christian Studies9(1989):71­86. Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self.EditedbyIrenaKuznetsova, Jonardon Ganeri, and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad. Farnham, Surrey; Burlington,VT: AshgatePublishing,2012.Pp.255+ix.Hardcover$99.95,isbn978-1-4094-5662-9. ebookavailable. ReviewedbyStephen Phillips UniversityofTexasatAustin phillips@mail.utexas.edu "I Proudly ActandSleepWho Touched and Saw" Hindu and Buddhist Ideas in Dialogue: Self and No-Self,editedbyIrenaKuznetsova, JonardonGaneri,andChakravarthiRam-Prasad,isabookbyphilosophersengaging withclassicalIndianviewsonselfandconsciousnessthatpresentsnotonlyHindu andBuddhistviewsindialoguebutalsothecontributorsindialoguewithoneanother.Eachphilosopher/scholaraddressesaperiod,school,orargumentinthelong historyofclassicalthoughtonthesubjectofself(orno-self ,andmost,itisevident, ) shareddrafts,withtheresultthatthevolumefeelslikeatextbook xceptthatthe --e papersaretoooriginalinsomeinstances.AswearetoldbyRam-Prasad(p.1),the bookwasmotivatedfromthefirstbytheeditors'sensethatwhileclassicalBuddhist viewsandargumentsonself,orno-self,andconsciousnessweregarneringwelcome attentioninanalyticphilosophy(e.g.,Sideritsetal.2011),thoseofHinduschools suchasAdvaitaandNyya,whichhavemuchtosayonthesetopics,werenot.The gap is filled here, and with papers drawing not just on these two relatively wellknownschools,AdvaitaandNyya,butalsoonSkhya,Mms,andKashmiri Shaivism.Thereisgreaterunitystill,inthatthelastpaper,byBarua,supplementing aten-pageintroductionbyRam-Prasad,presentsanoverviewoftheessays'achievements,and,indeed,throughthelensofthepapers,asunderstoodbyBarua,provides perspectiveonbroadquestionsaboutthevalueofclassicalIndianthoughtasawhole forcontemporaryphilosophicconcerns.Inotherwords,Ram-PrasadandBarua nd --a someoftheotherauthorsaswell ssumetheroleofareviewercognizantofthe --a papersasaunit.WhatIhavetosay,then,isakindofmeta-review. Barua'sidentificationofthemostvitalareasoftheclassicalliteratureonpoint seemstomelargelyontarget.Theseincludeadimensionofwhathecalls,following SarvepalliRadhakrishnan,thetrans-empirical,or,asIprefer,theyogicorcontemplative,includingrenunciantviewsofselfthathaveitasfundamentallynon-natural,as capableofhavingnothingtodowiththeworld.Thisisnottosaythatthoroughly Volume64,Number1January2014253­260 ©2014byUniversityofHawai`iPress naturalistandnon-yogicaccountsofaselfcannotbeconstructedoutoflinesofclassical reflection and argument: witness the work of Ganeri, who argues against a spectatorialmodelofatrueselforconsciousnessendorsedinbothHinduandBuddhistcontemplativetraditionsandinfavorofanembodiedselfthatisnaturalbutfor that no less sui generis in developing attitudes and emotions that matter, that are endorsed,andasendorsedbecomepartofwhatitintrinsicallyis(aviewbestexpressedinGaneri2012,achapterofwhichappearshere).Itishardlyfreshnewsbut the philosophic diversity of the classical Indian scene probably cannot be overstressed.However,thereisatendency ithinmanypapers,althoughnotinBarua's --w orthoseonearlier,practicallypre-classical,ideasaboutselfandconsciousness,by Black,Jakubczak,andBurley ooverlookcontemplativestrandsofclassicalthought --t becausetheydonotconnectwellifatallwiththedominantreflectionsonthetopics ineithertheanalyticorphenomenologicaltraditionsoftheWest.EvenBaruamisses thisfailing,andIshouldliketohighlightitwhileexaminingthebook'shandlingof themainargumentsforaself. Synchronic and diachronic cognitive syntheses, as evident in a subject's ecognitions xpressed, for example, in "This thing that is yellow has a smooth r --e feel"(unifyingoversensorymodality)and"ThisisthatDevadattaIsawyesterday" (unifyingpresentandpast) remainstaysinclassicalpro-selfargumentation,and --a theygarnerthemostattentioninthiscollection.Ourexperienceofdurationinparticular challenges Buddhist momentariness metaphysics, as several contributors hammerhome.Itisalsoproblematicwhetherevenseeminglysynchronicunitycan beunderstoodwithoutcognitivesynthesesovertime,because,asNyyainsists,attending to information from one sense faculty

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Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: Jan 24, 2014

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