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Buddhist No-Self, the Person Convention, and the Metaphysics of Moral Practice: Is Hayashi's Emergentist Account of Vasubandhu's Ontology of Persons Explanatorily Self-Defeating?

Buddhist No-Self, the Person Convention, and the Metaphysics of Moral Practice: Is Hayashi's... <p>Abstract:</p><p>Offered here is a critique of Hayashi&apos;s (2016) account of the Buddhist view of persons as emergent epiphenomena. It is argued that ethical agency is an ineliminable part of a fundamental action-theoretic ontology of our normative moral practices. So, if ethical agency grounds our moral practices and persons ground ethical agency, an account of persons as non-epiphenomenal emergents is required.</p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

Buddhist No-Self, the Person Convention, and the Metaphysics of Moral Practice: Is Hayashi&apos;s Emergentist Account of Vasubandhu&apos;s Ontology of Persons Explanatorily Self-Defeating?

Philosophy East and West , Volume 70 (2) – May 12, 2020

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Publisher
University of Hawai'I Press
Copyright
Copyright © University of Hawai'i Press.
ISSN
1529-1898

Abstract

<p>Abstract:</p><p>Offered here is a critique of Hayashi&apos;s (2016) account of the Buddhist view of persons as emergent epiphenomena. It is argued that ethical agency is an ineliminable part of a fundamental action-theoretic ontology of our normative moral practices. So, if ethical agency grounds our moral practices and persons ground ethical agency, an account of persons as non-epiphenomenal emergents is required.</p>

Journal

Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: May 12, 2020

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