Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.
type of non-realism developed in his work is both non-idealism and non-skepticism. ´¯ Ram-Prasad takes Sri Harsa's position as akin to naturalism, by which he understands a brand of analytic philosophy involving an attitude of suspension of metaphysics as we find it in Wittgenstein and Strawson. ´¯ In section 4 Ram-Prasad offers comparative remarks on David Hume and Sri ´ ri Harsa is represented as having Harsa with regard to the problem of causality. S ¯ argued that causal connections that are reported in our experience are not there in the world independent of cognition. Ram-Prasad takes this to be a modest view in that such a position neither goes beyond nor falls short of the deliverance of cognition. He concludes his book with observations on the problem of perception against the backdrop of the direct theory of perception, representationalism, and adverbial theory of consciousness of the Western tradition as well as Indian theories of per´¯ ception involving the thesis of nirakaratva and that of sakaratva. Sri Harsa rejects the ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ direct theories of perception. This implies a suspension of metaphysical commitment to objects of perception, and this is consistent with the variety of non-realism
Philosophy East and West – University of Hawai'I Press
Published: Mar 26, 2004
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.