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Avicenna's Notion of Fiṭrīyāt: A Comment on Dimitri Gutas' Interpretation

Avicenna's Notion of Fiá¹­rÄ«yāt: A Comment on Dimitri Gutas' Interpretation COMMENT AND DISCUSSION Avicenna’s Notion of Fitrīyāt: A Comment on Dimitri Gutas’ Interpretation Mohammad Saleh Zarepour Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München saleh.zarepour@lrz.uni-muenchen.de I. Introduction In an illuminating article, Dimitri Gutas has tried to show that Avicenna’s theory of knowledge should be understood within a full-blown empiricist framework very similar to that of John Locke. Gutas’ argument is based on an analysis of Avicennian ‘principles of syllogism’ (mabādī al-qiyās). The principles of syllogism are those judgments and propositions that form the irreducible and axiomatic foundations of syllogisms and definitions. Avicenna categorizes these principles based on how we accept and acknowledge the truth (tasdīq) of them. This categorization appears, with some slight modifica- tions, in many places in Avicenna’s oeuvre, for example in the Kitābal-Burhān 4 5 6 of al-Šifā’, and the logic parts of al-Nag ˇāt and al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt. According to al-Nag ˇāt, the principles of syllogism are divided into sixteen types based on the cognitive mechanisms through which we grasp them. Gutas’ argument for his main claim has two steps: (a) he considers these different types of principles, one by one, quoting the most important texts in which Avicenna discusses each of these principles; and (b) he shows, based on his analysis http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Philosophy East and West University of Hawai'I Press

Avicenna's Notion of Fiṭrīyāt: A Comment on Dimitri Gutas' Interpretation

Philosophy East and West , Volume 70 (3) – Jul 3, 2020

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University of Hawai'I Press
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Abstract

COMMENT AND DISCUSSION Avicenna’s Notion of Fitrīyāt: A Comment on Dimitri Gutas’ Interpretation Mohammad Saleh Zarepour Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München saleh.zarepour@lrz.uni-muenchen.de I. Introduction In an illuminating article, Dimitri Gutas has tried to show that Avicenna’s theory of knowledge should be understood within a full-blown empiricist framework very similar to that of John Locke. Gutas’ argument is based on an analysis of Avicennian ‘principles of syllogism’ (mabādī al-qiyās). The principles of syllogism are those judgments and propositions that form the irreducible and axiomatic foundations of syllogisms and definitions. Avicenna categorizes these principles based on how we accept and acknowledge the truth (tasdīq) of them. This categorization appears, with some slight modifica- tions, in many places in Avicenna’s oeuvre, for example in the Kitābal-Burhān 4 5 6 of al-Šifā’, and the logic parts of al-Nag ˇāt and al-Išārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt. According to al-Nag ˇāt, the principles of syllogism are divided into sixteen types based on the cognitive mechanisms through which we grasp them. Gutas’ argument for his main claim has two steps: (a) he considers these different types of principles, one by one, quoting the most important texts in which Avicenna discusses each of these principles; and (b) he shows, based on his analysis

Journal

Philosophy East and WestUniversity of Hawai'I Press

Published: Jul 3, 2020

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