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Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law

Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law The way in which mental incapacity in criminal law has been approached to date has not produced a thorough understanding of it. The idea that mental incapacity's chief relevance in criminal law is as a basis for exculpation dominates the scholarship—both doctrinal and philosophical—on mental incapacity. In an effort to advance scholarly understanding of this area of criminal law, this article provides a reconstruction of the legal terrain concerned with mental incapacity—organized as mental incapacity doctrines, a subset of which is exculpatory. In my reconstruction, what unites the relevant aspects of the law is that each doctrine imagines an abnormal subject of the law, and where the doctrines are exculpatory, the evaluative inquiry is not indexed to the reasonable person. This reconstruction of mental incapacity in criminal law—as mental incapacity doctrines—cuts across existing categorizations of this terrain and, as such, offers a rethinking of this area of the criminal law. This reconstruction permits a reconceptualization of the role of mental incapacity in criminal law: it becomes clear that mental incapacity is the basis for doctrines which perform a multiplicity of roles—inculpation, imputation, and a procedural role—beyond exculpation. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png New Criminal Law Review University of California Press

Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law

New Criminal Law Review , Volume 15 (1) – Jan 1, 2012

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Publisher
University of California Press
Copyright
© 2012 by the Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press's Rights and Permissions website, http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp .
ISSN
1933-4192
eISSN
1933-4206
DOI
10.1525/nclr.2012.15.1.1
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

The way in which mental incapacity in criminal law has been approached to date has not produced a thorough understanding of it. The idea that mental incapacity's chief relevance in criminal law is as a basis for exculpation dominates the scholarship—both doctrinal and philosophical—on mental incapacity. In an effort to advance scholarly understanding of this area of criminal law, this article provides a reconstruction of the legal terrain concerned with mental incapacity—organized as mental incapacity doctrines, a subset of which is exculpatory. In my reconstruction, what unites the relevant aspects of the law is that each doctrine imagines an abnormal subject of the law, and where the doctrines are exculpatory, the evaluative inquiry is not indexed to the reasonable person. This reconstruction of mental incapacity in criminal law—as mental incapacity doctrines—cuts across existing categorizations of this terrain and, as such, offers a rethinking of this area of the criminal law. This reconstruction permits a reconceptualization of the role of mental incapacity in criminal law: it becomes clear that mental incapacity is the basis for doctrines which perform a multiplicity of roles—inculpation, imputation, and a procedural role—beyond exculpation.

Journal

New Criminal Law ReviewUniversity of California Press

Published: Jan 1, 2012

Keywords: mental incapacity criminal responsibility exculpation

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